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Abstract
In early 2019, the United States officially started its direct negotiations with the
Taliban to reach an agreement on a joint framework for a future peace deal in
Afghanistan and inter-Afghan negotiations. Although debate continued over the size and
duration of the US military presence in Afghanistan and the inclusion of the terrorist
group the Taliban in the government of Afghanistan, what fell in and out of the headlines
were the topic of women’s presence, their rights, and two decades of advocacy and
achievements in these peace-building efforts. While the United Nations Security
Council’s resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, set into motion a consistent
global movement towards recognition of gender-based roles and experiences to end
violence and build sustainable peace, during the recent process of peace in Afghanistan,
Afghan women consistently remained underrepresented both by the United States and the
Taliban. Consequently, they have been feeling the rage that reached its peak by the fall of
Afghanistan into the Taliban's hands in August 2021. My research “No Peace for
Afghanistan: Case-Study of the Failure of Peace-Building Process in Afghanistan from a
Transnational Feminist Standpoint,” addresses Afghan women’s marginalization from the
recent process of peace negotiations, offers a new narrative of their advocacies for their
lives and being included in landmark decision-making processes during the past twenty
years, and analyzes the international community’s strategies in implementing peace
negotiations with the Taliban, concerning women's conditions. Relying on case-study
methodology as well as content analysis and virtual/patchwork ethnography by exploring
online resources such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Zoom applications, I will discuss
how Afghan women, victims of war crimes, and other minorities felt marginalized from
the decision-making process of peace-building. With this research, I aim to find possible
answers to the question of what went wrong during the recent process of peace in
Afghanistan. This research challenges the United States’ counterterrorism efforts and
their impact on Afghan women’s situation, and US-Taliban’s exclusionary peace
agreement through international human rights law and transnational feminism lens, and
finally addresses the legal and feminist deficits of their agreement.
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Introduction
In 1993, I was born when my family was on the run from Kabul’s war and were
trying to find shelter to save their lives, leaving our house, which was robbed and torn by
the militias and other parties to the war. In addition, when I was one year old, my family
and I got internally displaced. We had to flee from Kabul to a safer place in the West
region of Afghanistan with the intention of seeking refuge in Iran. It was only until we
learned that Iran had started to deport Afghan refugees and immigrants and send them
back to Afghanistan. Consequently, my parents prevented us from being exposed to
facing that kind of cruelty and misery by deciding to stay in Afghanistan. Thus, different
generations of my family have lived through the last 40 years of war in Afghanistan.
Being born and raised in a war-torn country like Afghanistan, there is no part of my life’s
history and identity intact of war and its trauma. That’s why I have invested my life,
education, and professional career and goals in reading, learning, and teaching anti-war
ideologies and thoughts.
In 2021, the first year of my second Master’s degree, I took a course on learning
transitional feminism.1 Throughout this course, I shared my experiences of war and my

1

Transnational feminist perspectives focus on the diverse experiences of women who live within, between, and at the
margins or boundaries of nation-states around the globe; they transcend nation-state boundaries and speak to a wide
range of interacting forces that have an impact on gendered relationships and experiences in a geopolitical context.
They also encompass “border work” and communication across traditional global boundaries; may occur in global,
regional, and local contexts; and include the experiences of immigrants, refugees, displaced persons, those who have
experienced forced migration, members of a cultural diaspora who may be dispersed across multiple regions, as well as
those who identify themselves as third-culture persons and persons who are attempting to integrate multiple cultural
identities. Transnational feminist theory and practice emphasize intersectionality, interdisciplinary, social activism,
justice, and collaboration. They seek to destabilize notions that women around the world share the same types of
experiences, oppressions, forms of exploitation, and privileges; they explore differences and inequalities between
women, such as different priorities and ways of understanding gender issues and different ways of conceptualizing
agency. Transnational and postcolonial feminisms highlight social-structural factors that exacerbate power differences,
including colonialism and neocolonialism, economic realities, and global capitalism. Postcolonial feminisms resist

1

craving for peace. Transnational feminism’s theory helped me solidify my thoughts
around my research interests which include “gender dynamics of war,” “peace,” and
“women’s place and the situation concerning both.” In this course, I learned that
according to Valentine M. Moghadam there are four types of contemporary transnational
feminist networks: those that target the neoliberal economic policy agenda; those that
focus on the danger of fundamentalism and insist on women’s human rights, especially in
the Muslim world; women’s peace groups that target conflict, war, and empire which is
called feminism against war and conflict; and networks engaging in feminist
humanitarianism and international solidarity (2015, 7-8).
My research could fit in any of these divisions. But mainly, I located my research to
“feminism against war and conflict” and tried to approach it from a human rights law
perspective. Furthermore, I want to add that, it hasn’t been the easiest thing in the world
to research and write about your experiences of war, trauma, and marginalization of
women. But as an Afghan woman of color in the United States, I can say that my
decision regarding my feminist research and activism has forever been impacted by
imperialism and power structures that have changed my country into a war-torn one.
Thus, as an advocate of women’s human rights, I have always felt the responsibility of
raising my voice against war and women’s oppression; and kept myself accountable to all
those Afghan women who are back home and expect me to give them a voice by bringing
their experiences into discussions.

colonial and imperialist forces; reject Euro-American feminisms that universalize women’s oppressions; and are
informed by the distinctive social, political, and historical contexts and oppression of women (Enns, 2021,11-13).
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Initially, when I decided to write on women, war, and peace, Afghanistan was going
through actual debates regarding the peace negotiations with the Taliban. Thus, at that
time, my intention and purpose in writing on this topic were to advocate for the inclusion
of women in this landmark decision-making process. But unfortunately, after the fall of
Afghanistan to the Taliban’s hands on August 15, 2021, I decided to change the narrative
of my research and analyze what went wrong with the recent process of peace that the
people of Afghanistan had to live under the cruelty of the Taliban’s rule once again, how
Afghan women were marginalized from this process, and finally what is the role of the
international community, international organizations, and transnational feminist networks
in these regards.
In addition, with this research, I aim to change the narrative of Afghan women’s
advocacies for being included in the recent process of peace. In the world’s eyes,
specifically the west, Afghan women have been portrayed as passive victims, agency-less
objects, and people in need of being saved even without having them share their
experiences and standpoints. Western countries’ fantasy over the idea of Afghan
women’s victimization and liberation has a longstanding history that mostly has
overshadowed and overlooked Afghan women’s subjectivities and agency. It is strange to
state but, until before August 15, 2021, and after 20 years of the US, and its western
allies’ active presence in Afghanistan, the image of Afghan women in the western media,
policies, and western/white/universal feminism is still dominated by a blue burqa (Fetrat,
2020). Thus, they haven’t been given the proper recognition for their tireless work,
activism, and resistance. This research, will introduce another aspect of Afghan women’s
3

experiences and advocacies that will shift and change the narrative regarding their
subjectivity and resistance. As well as will highlight the ways that Afghan women’s
voices, advocacies, and resistance were left unheard and ignored due to the available
power structures, policies, and politics of the western countries toward the so-called
“third world countries.”
My preliminary research shows that when the United Nations Security Council
adopted resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security in October 2000, it set into
motion a consistent global movement towards recognition that in war and peace, women
and men have different roles and experiences from violence, victimization, survival, and
peacebuilding. It formally recognized women’s agency and roles as well as their inherent
right to seek to end violence and in building a sustainable peace (Anderlini, 2020).
Despite this acknowledgment and the reams of policy statements and resolutions that
subsequently reiterated and reinforced this message, international diplomatic,
development, and security sector practices have not put this political and normative shift
into practice, and great reluctance still exists toward considering that focusing on gender
dimension is essential for assessing the crucial topics of war, conflict, peace-building,
and security agendas (Anderlini, 2020).
Since 2001, countries’ different agendas have to a great extent, focused on the global
fight against terrorism and have integrated very few contributions from women
concerning peace and security. Thus, women remain absent from their countries’ peace
negotiation and decision-making processes (Anderlini, 2007, 54). Among others,
Afghanistan is one of the countries where women have been hugely underrepresented and
4

systematically marginalized as core actors and peace agents in the peace negotiations
with the terrorist group the Taliban. In addition, the small percentage of women who
were given the right to be part of these negotiations, their role was limited, and the
quality of their participation was extremely low (Steiner and Robertson, 2019).
In this thesis, I argue that even though women’s contribution to peacebuilding and
their impact on the ground is vital but national and international state actors do not
usually recognize women’s skills and strategies in addressing war, conflicts, and
especially peace-building processes. Thus, undermining their role and impact has been
one of the reasons that Afghanistan is suffering from the Taliban’s rule once again.
Accordingly, this paper covers the case study of Afghanistan regarding peace
negotiations with the Taliban and the marginalization of women from having a
meaningful presence and participation in this decision-making process. Moreover, in
general, it highlights the need to recognize women peacebuilders, as core actors in the
conflict settings, working directly on issues related to preventing resolving, and
transforming them as their male counterparts to avoid the deterioration of the human
rights situation in the countries involved. As well as it analyzes the failure of the peacebuilding process through the lens of human rights and international law by exploring the
peace agreement between the Taliban and the USA.
This paper has three chapters. The first chapter has covered methodological statement
and positionality. Here I have worked on explaining my research method, which is the
case study methodology and virtual ethnography to analyze data sources closely, to
respond, explain, and address the questions of what went wrong in the peace process of
5

Afghanistan, and discuss how women were left out of this landmark phase of the
decision-making about the country. In addition, in the positionality section, I have located
myself within and through this research and have tried to lay out the impacts of the
different aspects of my identities as strengths and possible challenges in relation to my
research. Following this, in the second chapter, I have located scholarly debates about the
importance of women’s meaningful representation in the process of peace, the strengths
and challenges of the United Nations security council resolution 1325 regarding women’s
security, and women and peace-building from a transnational feminist perspective to
highlight the theoretical framework for this research. In the final chapter, I have analyzed,
compared, and connected the available data about Afghan women’s systematic
marginalization in the process of peace negotiation with the Taliban. Over and above
that, using the abovementioned methodology, I have analyzed the failures of the resect
process of peace through the lens of human rights and international law in regard to the
agreements.

Chapter one: Methodological Statement and Positionality
This chapter consists of two main sections: the first section discusses methodological
statements and reviews methods and research design. In addition, the second section of
the chapter provides a brief analysis of my positionality as an Afghan woman and a
researcher. This section, discusses different aspects of identity and how my positionality
informs this research project.

6

Methodological Statement
The case study methodology is carried out in this research project. The case study
methodology is widely recognized in the social sciences- especially when a holistic and
in-depth investigation of a topic or case is required. The case study research method
allows for the inclusion of different methods because what is paramount in this research
method is understanding the complexity and uniqueness of the case, and a variety of
methods offer different angles to comprehending complexity and uniqueness (Simons,
2009).
Zaidah Zainal states that there are several categories of case study methodology,
including exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory case studies. Among other types,
explanatory case study methodology has been widely recognized and used for
implementing comprehensive and in-depth research, specifically in complex and
multivariate cases. Zainal further points out that using the explanatory case studies
examines the data closely to explain the phenomena, problems, and the question in the
data (2017, 2). For this research, I applied an explanatory case study methodology to 1)
analyze data sources closely to respond, explain, and address the questions of what went
wrong in the peace process of Afghanistan, 2) discuss how women were left out of this
landmark phase of the decision-making about the country. Moreover, under the umbrella
of the explanatory case study methodology, I interpreted and evaluated the available data,
including reports and agreements regarding to women's role in peace-building in
Afghanistan. I identified and analyzed themes by developing conceptual categories and
challenging the assumptions regarding the erasure of Afghan women (Zainal, 2017).
7

Furthermore, Helen Simon finds that case study methodology enables researchers to
document multiple perspectives, explore contested viewpoints, and demonstrate the
influence of key actors and interactions between them in telling complex stories (2009,
23). I believe that it helped me to do the same in telling Afghan women’s stories of
marginalization during the recent peace process.
Among others, one of the most important reasons for selecting the case study
research method was that it allowed the exploration and understanding of complex issues
such as the peace process of Afghanistan and how women were ignored throughout the
process. Thus, through the case study method, I was able to understand the depth of the
problems that existed in the process of peace and understand what some of the stories of
women who had been precluded from the peace negotiations as active agents were.
Therefore, I believe thorough an extensive analysis of Afghan women's role and
marginalization through the case study research method helped explain both the process
and outcomes of this process. Thus, in order to implement this research method and
comprehensively investigate the case study of Afghanistan, peace, and women, I also
implement content and media analysis. Content analysis is the systematic study of
various forms of communication and aims at description rather than explanation. Patricia
Leavy and Sharlene Hesse-Biber state that using this research method, researchers
examine existing non-interactive texts, which classifies the research process as
“unobtrusive.” Many different kinds of texts and the already available data can be studied
(Leavy and Hesse-Biber, 2006, 225-23). For the purposes of this research, I have
conducted a feminist content analysis using multiple data sources and analysis techniques
8

for examining diverse data, including but not limited to articles written on the topic of
Afghan women and peace, peace documents, and social media activity.
In addition, I applied aspects of virtual ethnography as a research approach for
exploring social interactions in virtual and online environments (Given, 2008). These
interactions often occur on the internet on newsgroups, chat rooms, and web-based
discussion forums. It is worth mentioning that the notion of virtual ethnography builds on
existing principles for ethnographic research that stress the immersion of the researcher in
the setting for extended periods and the aspiration to an in-depth holistic understanding of
a concept (Given, 2008). Furthermore, according to Gökçe Günel, Saiba Varma, and
Chika Watanabe, in their piece A Manifesto for Patchwork Ethnography, immersion in
the virtual environment and connecting the collected data with the available research in
the field is recently has also been called “Patchwork Ethnography.” Gökçe Günel, Saiba
Varma, and Chika Watanabe emphasize that this method of ethnography offers a new
form of knowledge production. They also argue that patchwork ethnography enables the
researchers to interpret the data, stories, and experiences; redefine what counts as
knowledge and research; and finally, how to turn realities that present the constraints and
limitations into prospects for new insights (Günel et al., 2020).
In this research, I have applied aspects of virtual ethnography based on the
interpretations and interactions of Afghan women related to the process of peace, its
impact on their lives, and their activism. My approach also centers on Afghan women’s
advocacies for being included in the process of peace shared on social media, including
Facebook, a WhatsApp group named “Together Stronger,” and Twitter. Among other
9

platforms, I focused on Afghan women’s activism and advocacy through the “Together
Stronger” WhatsApp group. This is a widely used group that has brought together Afghan
women who had been working in the government of Afghanistan, NGOs, independent
activists, journalists, human rights defenders, women’s rights defenders, politicians, and
leaders of different collective action projects both those who were inside Afghanistan and
those in the diaspora. Furthermore, this group chat consisted of 131 members-all women
members who are both inside of Afghanistan and parts of the diaspora working for the
same goals and purposes: uplifting women’s voices; and advocating for institutionalizing
their place in the process of peace for their future.
At the beginning of 2021, I was invited to the group by my friend Malalai Habibi,
an activist and member of the International Civil Society Action Group (ICAN)
organization, located in the USA, which works to support women who lead peace
initiatives in Afghanistan. From the beginning of the time, Afghan women felt sidelined
and ignored in the process of peace this group has arranged and directed so many
different women-led direct actions, petitions, and meetings to discuss the needs of women
during the period of peace negotiation. I combined these data with the available research
and reports on the ground using the virtual and patchwork ethnography techniques.
Finally, after careful consideration, I decided that interviewing Afghan women would not
be the suitable option that could give me the possibility of a structured and in-depth
analysis of all the events related to the process of peace. In addition, the country’s
security situation has made it almost impossible to be able to conduct interviews and
conversations with the Afghan women activists' without causing them harm, difficulty,
10

and insecurity from the Taliban. In contrast, the case-study method was an ideal method
to explain and examine the aspects of the peace process in Afghanistan in an extensive
way and without any harm to anyone. Thus, to prevent harm and for data analysis, I will
keep the anonymity of the peoples' experiences and data collected from virtual
ethnography shared in online spaces.
Positionality
Abigail Brooks and Sharlene Hesse-Biber emphasize the importance of
positionality and reflexivity in research and knowledge production. Positionality and
reflexivity consider the researcher’s standpoint, social background, location, and
assumptions that can influence the research and rejects the traditional idea of positivist
and value-neutral research. More importantly, it’s a way to account for their personal
biases and limitations and examine the positive and negative effects these elements may
or may not have on the research (Brooks and Hesse-Biber, 2007). Likewise, feminist
researchers such as Leavy and Harris have also argued that acknowledging and reflecting
on researchers’ connection to the research topic is crucial because it is a way for the
researchers to examine their position in the context of their research topic and
acknowledge their biases that might impact the research results and outcomes before the
audience/readers. (Hesse-Biber, 2014; Leavy and Harris, 2019).
Reflecting on my own identities and positions as a Muslim, immigrant, Afghan
woman of color, and researcher, I acknowledge that the elements of my identity can be
instrumental and at the same time, a reason for the complexity and possible limitation in
implementing this research. Only by reading these three sentences about my identity one
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can easily feel that aspects of my identity position me as an insider and outsider
researching this topic. Sonya Corbin Dwyer and Jennifer L. Buckle’s statement in their
article, The Space Between Being an Insider-Outsider in Qualitative Research, argue that
for the complexity of researchers’ position, the space between insider and outsider, and
its importance for the researcher’s analysis, interpretation, and reading of the data and the
case (2009, 54-63).
Furthermore, as an insider researcher, it is impossible for me to see myself apart
from this research because I have been directly impacted by war, conflict, and the process
of peace both as an Afghan national and a woman. As a child, I remember the cruelty of
the Taliban’s previous rule and the U.S. invasion. Also, I have lived through the bomb
explosions, witnessed and worked on reporting the civilian causalities during the years
after the US invasion. I have heavily felt marginalized from the process of peace. I can
relate to war trauma and marginalization from the process of peace. When I speak about
how Afghan women’s representation and voices were ignored in the peace negotiation
process, I’m talking about myself too, as I’m one of those Afghan women who felt
sidelined by not having any meaningful part and active representative of my own at the
peace table. Thus, my identity as an Afghan woman is inseparable from the topic of my
research, the inequalities, and the marginalization that I’m writing about. Moreover, these
experiences have put me in a position where I see things and feel them from my
standpoint and via my experiences from war and peace.
On the other hand, there have been moments that my work and research have
made me reconsider the politics of location and its impact on our life and the work that
12

Chandra Talpade Mohanty writes about in her book Feminism Without Borders:
Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (2003, 43-84). For instance, the moments that
I had to pause and reflect on my privilege of not spending the challenging times of the
peace negotiation inside Afghanistan; the times that I felt the heaviness of the pain that
Afghan women felt inside of Afghanistan differently because it was only via the news
and social media; and the times that I didn’t feel threatened and insecure as a result of
sharing my anti-Taliban opinion on social media simply because I have been out of the
reach of the Taliban’s threat and living in the USA.
As pointed out earlier, I have earned a crucial portion of my academic degrees
from the United States. Firstly, I got my first Master’s degree, an LL.M. in International
Human Rights Law from the University of Notre Dame, and the second one, a MA in
Gender and Women’s Studies from the Minnesota State University, Mankato.
Throughout the process of these educational journeys in the USA, I have been trained
about the importance of implementing the principles of human rights law in governance,
war, and peacetime; the values of applying the theories of intersectionality2 in research
and activism; and the crucial role of understanding the transnationality of feminism and
feminist activism. My standpoint, knowledge of Afghanistan’s context, women’s
situation and frustration for being excluded from the society, and social backgrounds

2

The term Intersectionality was coined by a black feminist legal scholar, Kimberly Crenshaw, in 1989 when she
highlighted the intersection of race and gender in black women’s employment in the USA. The concept of
intersectionality describes the ways in which systems of inequality based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
gender identity, disability, class and other forms of discrimination “intersect” to create unique dynamics and effects
(Nira, 2006).
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were extremely helpful to be aware of how to incorporate and apply my knowledge of the
theories in practice and concerning my research project.
Over and above that, fortunately, I was equipped with the knowledge of the
English language, which opened the door to a tremendous number of academic resources
for me to pursue these degrees and develop the current research project. Having the
advantage of speaking in English specifically helped me with being able to use the
academic resources written in English regarding the situation of Afghanistan’s war and
the process of peace considering women’s representation and condition. This was crucial
because there hasn’t been much research and resources available regarding the issues
mentioned above in the Persian language.
Furthermore, I’m grateful and confident that my identity put me in a suitable
position for researching this topic throughout the research. As a positive point, my
knowledge of the context, experiences, and closeness to this research allowed me to be
aware of women's experiences, specifically, those who could be great peace negotiators
but were marginalized, and their role was systematically ignored. I also want to
acknowledge and recognize that my closeness to this research, war, and peace can be
considered a limitation because of my point of view and biases that I might or might not
have in this regard. But I emphasize that through this feminist research which is
extensively focused and dedicated to highlighting women's marginalization from the
process of peace and presenting their advocacies in these areas, using the case study
method of analysis, I tried ethically benefit from my identities in my research and reduce
the limitations they might have caused (Hesse-Biber, 2014; Leavy and Harris, 2019).
14

Furthermore, in the capacity of an Afghan researcher, I want to mention that I’m proudly
biased in favor of peace, Afghan women’s right to be included in decision making
processes such as the peace process, and vigorously argue against war, women’s
marginalization, and ignorance toward their role in the process of peace.
Chandra Talpade Mohanty states that the western world and specifically western
feminism appropriates and colonize the complexities of the lives of women from third
world countries and ignores the differences in their experiences by the notion of the
women as a homogenous category (2013, 967-91; Also see Mohanty, 2003, 39-42). As
an Afghan woman, I can easily state that women from countries such as Afghanistan are
deemed as “the other” and “the over there category” who have always been presumed as
passives, agency-less, and victims who are in need of being saved by their savior (the
west) and packaged in a blue burqa, presented to and by the west specifically the USA to
justify the war of terror, invasions, the western Orientalist gaze, and to bring the fantasy
of civilization to life which at times fed into the salvation attitude of western feminism as
well (Fetrat, 2020).
Chandra Mohanty further argues that unlike the history of Western feminism,
which has been explored in great detail over the last few decades, histories of the socalled Third World women’s engagement with feminism and their activism are in short
supply and have been left unheard, which needs to be highlighted and shared (2003, 47).
Being aware of the fact that as an Afghan woman, I’m counted as a member of the socalled Third World women and the complex intersection of the identities, I offer a new
narrative of Afghan women in which they are far beyond “only passive victims” but also
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active agents who demanded and fought for their right to be included in the process of
peace, even if the whole system was ignoring their role and importance of their
experiences for building sustainable peace. In addition, I attempted to share their
advocacies during the process of peace that will reject the presumption of the West about
them “being only victims” and disrupt the comfortable, which is the traditional way of
thinking about Afghan women.

Chapter two: Literature Review Chapter
In this literature review, I discuss and highlight the need to recognize women
peacebuilders as core actors in the conflict settings, working directly on issues related to
preventing, resolving, and transforming them as their male counterparts, to prevent from
deterioration of the human rights situation of the countries involved. For example, among
others, Afghanistan is one of the countries where women are hugely underrepresented as
core actors in the process of peace negotiations with terroristic groups such as the
Taliban. In addition, the small percentage of women who have been given the right to be
part of these negotiations, their roles have been limited, and the quality of their
participation has been extremely low. In the first section, I present a brief discussion
about women’s contribution to peace-building processes: what has been done? Next, I
discuss women and peace-building from a transnational feminist perspective and women
getting to the peace table: why it matters? What do they do? After setting the theoretical
frameworks for understanding women’s role in peace-building processes, I discuss
human rights and peace: the role of the international community, organizations, powers
of the region, and regional transnational feminist networks in forming inclusive peace
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processes. Finally, I will briefly discuss the understanding of peace agreements under the
rules of international law.
Women’s Contribution in Peace-Building Process: What Has Been Done?
When the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on women,
peace, and security in October 2000, it set into motion a consistent global movement
towards recognition that in war, women and men have different roles and experiences
from violence, victimization, survival, and peacebuilding. It formally recognized
women’s agency and roles as well as their inherent right to seek to end violence and in
building sustainable peace (Anderlini, 2020).
According to Sanam Naraghi, despite this acknowledgment and the reams of policy
statements and resolutions that subsequently reiterated and reinforced this message,
international diplomatic, development, and security sector practices have not put this
political and normative shift into practice, and great reluctance still exists toward
considering that focusing on gender dimension is essential for assessing the crucial topics
of war, conflict, peace-building, and security agendas (2020, 1). Anderlini further states
in Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters that since 2001, countries’
different agendas have to a great extent focused on the global fight against terrorism and
have integrated very few contributions from women concerning peace and security. Thus,
women remain absent from their countries’ peace negotiation and decision-making
processes (2007, 54).
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Carol Cohn and Cynthia H. Enloe emphasize that the starting point for thinking about
women and wars must be that women’s experiences and their relations to war are
extremely diverse than men’s. Women both try to prevent wars and instigate wars. They
are not the sole passive victims of war, but also, they are politically supportive of wars
and as well as they protest against wars (2013, 1). Similarly, when the war is over,
women need to be considered for rebuilding their communities and countries. Again
because of the different experiences of men and women during the wars and conflicts,
they need to be equally considered in the rebuilding of the country through the process of
peace (Cohn and Enloe, 2013). Additionally, peace is inextricably linked to equality
between women and men. Maintaining and promoting peace and security requires
women’s equal participation in every step of decision-making. This recognition of the
necessity to advance women’s equal involvement in all aspects of peacebuilding and
reconstruction was underscored at the launch of the landmark UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (hereinafter SCR 1325 or resolution
1325), which represented a breakthrough in the Council’s recognition of women’s roles
and experiences during conflict, its resolution, and post-conflict stabilization
(Whittington, 2015).
Anderlini (2007) highlights that SCR 1325 calls for women to be directly involved as
key players in national reconstruction following state/government’s failure during the
conflict. This resolution can serve as one of the essential achievements of the world and
is a valuable instrument for putting women’s views and priorities, and their skills,
experiences, and capacities at the center of peacebuilding efforts (2007, 53). Article 8 of
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the resolution 1325 specifically calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and
implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including addressing
special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction (Patton, 2017). It also requires the
introduction of “measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous
processes for conflict resolution,” as well as the direct and meaningful involvement of
women “in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements” (Anderlini
2007, 2). Accordingly, years after adopting the resolution, one can ask, whether the SCR
1325 brought women to the peace table? indeed, since it was passed, women’s demands
for inclusion have been in the discussions more often. But a question remains: has the
SCR 1325 effectively and practically brought women to the peace tables and been
implemented as it should have? Not at all. There is still plenty of foot-dragging among
politicians, diplomats, and the capitalist/imperialist systems regarding the implication of
the SCR 1325 (Anderlini, 2007, 73).
Women and Peace-Building from Transnational Feminist Perspective: Institutions
and Representation
Over two decades, diverse actors have been fashioning a collective response to the
disproportionate impact of modern war on women. Motivating factors have included an
emerging recognition of the need for human security and the growing awareness that
military force is insufficient. Where women are concerned, the women, peace, and
security (hereinafter WPS) agenda have become a key mechanism in the pursuit of
inclusive policies. For example, survivors of the 1990s Bosnian genocide have
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campaigned for UN action to ensure women’s full participation in security decisions by
employing the principles of WPS in their advocacy. Moreover, the experiences of women
in conflict, coupled with their exclusion from formal processes, have inspired a
groundswell of political activism among women (Hunt and Nderitu, 2018).
According to Jennifer F. Klot (2015), for transnational feminists, SCR 1325 bestowed
unprecedented legitimacy on an international peacebuilding agenda for women. It
established new norms and standards for UN peace operations by mandating the
consideration of gender equality in all Security Council actions to build peace and resolve
conflicts. Considered the single greatest achievement in “engendering” global security
policy, SCR 1325 is celebrated as a triumph for women’s peace movements and
transnational feminist organizing. Alongside the expansive catalog of achievements
regarding the SCR 1325, however, there is growing skepticism about SCR 1325’s
potential to advance feminist and peacebuilding agendas and visions. A burgeoning corpus of academic and policy analysis, feminist theorizing, national action plans, policy
guidance, and case studies provides a rich but uneven account of its impact in areas
ranging from violence & conflict prevention and women’s political participation to postconflict issues (Klot, 2015). For instance, transnational feminists, including Soumita Basu
and Akhila Nagar, have argued that SCR 1325 does not confront the structural roots of
gender inequality, including entrenched understandings of patriarchy, masculinity, and
militarized power. Whereas mainstream security discourse identifies the state as its
referent object, a feminist understanding and interpretation of security aims to not only
eliminate all forms of violence but also the ideology of militarism in itself. Doing so, they
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try to provide the world with an alternate and transformative vision of security. However,
how UNSCR 1325 is discursively reproduced serves to legitimize war and militarized
security. Such militarized understanding of peace does not conform to ending wars in
themselves but rather the practices within warfare (Basu and Nagar, 2021).
Furthermore, transnational feminists are openly skeptical about the potential for UN
peace operations to address women’s concerns and have always been pointing to the
institutional and political reasons behind this issue. Institutionally, Charlotte Bunch
distinguishes among “four somewhat separate, sometimes intersecting tracks at the UN
including human rights; development; security; and humanitarian assistance.” According
to Bunch, bringing these tracks together raised the concern for women’s rights activists
that “human rights of women might fall out of the picture.” She explains that “the peace
and security people and women’s human rights people are not the same groups, and do
not work together very much, in the structures of the UN, they tend to be separate” (Klot,
2015).
Over and above that, Jacqui True emphasizes that debates around the “third world”
woman have addressed the issue of the dual colonization of women, oppressed by both
native and foreign patriarchies. Based on Mohanty (2003), discursive colonialism
critiques both “global sisterhood” and the othering of the “third world” woman,
highlighting the problematic history of feminism as imperialism, where feminists have
been complicit in both the production and the marginalization of the gendered subaltern.
Feminist criteria to bolster the civilizing mission of Western states were not only applied
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during the colonial rule but continue to inform postcolonial politics enacted through the
WPS “agenda.” There is a scramble to establish the efficacy of WPS in bringing gender
equality and justice to women in conflict areas (True, 2016, 307-323; Also see Otto,
2016; Pratt, 2013; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011). Specifically, there is considerable
pressure to improve a lot of the women “out there,” from state agencies, neoliberal global
institutions, and even corporate interests, who fund both WPS research and practical
initiatives (Pratt, 2013).
Finally, it can be concluded that transnational feminists have important considerations
regarding women’s role in peacebuilding, their agency, and representation, as well as the
efficiency of different institutions such as the UN and legal instruments such as the SCR
1325. They advocate for the right and meaningful representation and inclusion of all
diverse experiences in the process of decision making, such as peace, etc.
Women Getting to The Peace Table: Factors of Ignoring Women’s Role in Peacebuilding
According to Anderlini (2007), a recurring theme among the women’s grassroots
organizations is their resistance to war and militarization. Often the same women who
initially take a stand to prevent war are the first ones to regroup and call for a negotiated
peace and end to war. These efforts and the search for a moderate peace are never easy
paths. The simple act of meeting each other at a time of fear, mistrust, and insecurity
reign can be life-threatening. It is always a struggle to move beyond religious, ethnic, or
familial affiliation to focus on peace and coexistence. Yet, as women know that their
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perspective and point of view need to be included in these processes, they are stepping
into the fray and trying to find common grounds (Anderlini, 2007).
Despite women’s efforts, they haven’t always meaningfully been included in the
decision-making processes. Anderlini further states that some activists claim misogyny
and sexism for women’s exclusion from the peace process (2007, 58). In a similar
argument, Joana Cook, in her book A woman's place: US counterterrorism since 9/11,
refers to the paucity of women in leadership positions in political parties, the state, or
non-state groups as one of the reasons for their absence from the peace-building
processes (Cook, 2021). More importantly, a common refrain among policymakers and
power structures involved in the peace talks is that the peace table is not a venue for
discussing gender equality or women’s issues. These are important issues, they say, but
should come at a later stage. Implicit in such comments is the notion that women only
care about issues of gender equality and that women’s issues are their sole concern. There
is even less consciousness of and much skepticism about women’s capacities, knowledge,
and experiences to engage and contribute effectively to negotiating and building peace
and security. Usually, parties to the negotiations determine who represents them
(Anderlini, 2007).
The international community and third countries involved in the process can provide
guidance or advice on the inclusion of women or general adherence with Resolution
1325. Yet these countries seem to forgo such actions, and demands for compliance with
the standards are rarely, if ever made. In addition, the credibility of women’s civil society
23

and politicians is often questioned. They don’t represent the broad population or the most
affected women by war. They are the elite, and their views or interests are way too
different than the perspective of the highly affected by wars and socially excluded from
the society during the opposition group’s regime. Moreover, there is also a prevailing
belief that peace accords are gender-neutral. In general, policymakers highlight reference
to human rights and justice broadly, suggesting that they encompass everyone, including
women (Anderlini, 2007).
Despite the factors mentioned above, women have adopted different approaches in
targeting the political arena and demanding negotiations. At the risk of stating the
obvious, women’s wartime and post-war activism is not homogenous but has multiple
expressions. Yet an overview of the literature shows that women’s war-time activism
tends to share similar goals in terms of encouraging awareness of women’s rights;
expanding women’s inclusion in peacebuilding initiatives and other decision-making
fora; and addressing women’s conflict as well as post-conflict insecurities (Cardenas and
Hedstrom, 2021). Some draw from or build on women’s rights movements, with an
explicit message of equality and demands for the right to participate in decision-making
processes and the firm belief that the peace process should promote more equitable
relations between women and men. Others build on their socially accepted identities as
mothers, daughters, or along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines and focus on critical peace
and security issues. The challenge for women in both ways is not only to open the
political space but also to create a solid public constituency that gives credibility to their
demands (Anderlini, 2007).
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For the women who have won the battle to get to the peace table, the struggle takes an
entirely new turn as negotiations begin. On the one hand, they face the challenge of
maintaining their presence and not being subject to the whims or pressure of political or
military factions to marginalize them. On the other hand, they have to demonstrate their
ability to influence and make a difference. Therefore, the challenge is not only to tackle
the critical agenda items but also to raise other issues missing from the peace talks
(Anderlini, 2007). Moreover, it is vital to emphasize women have an important role in
expanding the agenda of the peace process by bringing their perspectives and voices,
which have stem from the experiences they are the closest to, raising the voices of the
victims of wars and building trust among the parties of the negotiations (Anderlini,
2007). In addition, according to Anderlini 2020, both qualitative and quantitative research
over the past 20 years shows that: when women participate meaningfully, the chances of
peace agreements failing decrease by 35 percent, and when women’s civil society
movements are engaged in peace processes, there is a notable increase in the
implementation of the provisions in peace accords over the subsequent 10-year period
(2020, 6).
Human rights and Peace: Role of the international community, organizations,
powers of the region, and regional transnational feminist networks in forming
inclusive peace processes
The international human rights law (hereinafter IHRL) has played a significant role in
the development of feminist approaches to international law for resolving issues of peace
and conflict. Some of the very first publications by feminist international lawyers focused
on IHRL, seeing it as both reflective of the gendered nature of international law and a tool
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that could be used to bring about gender equality. IHRL has also been at the center of
discussions of diversity in feminist approaches to international law. There are three trends
in approaches to IHRL in feminist peace and conflict resolution. In some scholarship, IHRL
is central and seen as a powerful tool in addressing conflict. However, other feminist legal
scholars take a more equivocal approach, recognizing IHRL’s inherent weaknesses but
acknowledging that it has some role. In publications specifically on the United Nations
Security Council’s WPS agenda, references to IHRL are almost absent (Ogg and Craker,
2021).
A strong theme across this literature is that the feminist scholars pushing for IHRL to
play a central role in addressing conflict and women’s role in peacebuilding are not blind
to its shortcomings. Instead, they argue that while advocating for IHRL’s more
substantial role, critiques can also be addressed. For instance, Chinkin and Charlesworth
(2007) acknowledge that the criticisms of IHRL in the UN security council’s resolutions
on WPS can serve as a form of neo-colonialism. However, they cautioned that resistance
to IHRL-based reforms is often due to elites wanting to re-establish traditional systems
and hierarchies and powers not wanting to be held accountable for their action
concerning women and other minorities’ marginalization. Instead, they argue that IHRL
and its institutions must be reimagined in creative ways, such as comprehensive
recognition of women’s role and their social and cultural rights in the aftermath of armed
conflict and peacebuilding processes (Ogg and Craker, 2021).
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Among others, Isobel Renzulli argues that despite the critiques regarding IHRL’s
function, from a substantive point of view, the human rights infused WPS agenda can be
premised on a clear understanding of gender equality and the underlying conceptions. Is
this to be understood as consistency in treatment, granting equality before the law,
irrespective of the difference in terms of access to power, opportunities, resources, or
should gender equality be based on a more substantive view focusing on and addressing
the causes of inequality to eliminate them? Reference is made to a holistic approach to
conflict prevention and maintenance of peace underpinned by inclusive socioeconomic
development, creation of opportunities, and elimination of marginalization. The UN
global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 also endorses a substantive
approach to equality, for example, when referring to long-term strategies to address ‘the
root causes and structural drivers of conflict’ and structural inequality (Renzulli, 2017).
Furthermore, the UN global study also highlighted as a crucial area of intervention
the bolstering of the role of international human rights mechanisms and creating avenues
and processes that are gender-sensitive and gender-inclusive. While strengthening human
rights mechanisms and bodies at the different levels is an essential component of a
preventive WPS agenda, this cannot be done in isolation. It needs to be embedded within
the broader framework of the UN’s peace and security work and its network of
relationships with regional and sub-regional organizations. It is suggested that a shift
from a reactive to a proactive paradigm at the international level requires an active
endorsement and systematic inclusion of a human rights-infused WPS agenda by the UN
in its regional peace and security agreements. At the regional level, the link between
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regional peace and security policies and the human rights legal and institutional
frameworks should receive greater attention and be developed further (Renzulli, 2017).
Renzulli (2017) further stated that while international human rights mechanisms such
as CEDAW, treaty bodies, and the UN special procedures play a pivotal role in drawing
international attention to issues within the WPS agenda, the UN can do more to ensure
that this information and analysis reaches global peace and security decision- making
bodies, including the Security Council. The study suggests the establishment of formal
channels for the exchange of information between the UN human rights experts and the
UN political organs. Systematic exchange of information could contribute to the
formulation of decisions and policies by the UN political organs and provide a forum to
debate and devote specific attention to Resolution 1325 and women’s human rights.
Where the work of the various human rights bodies and experts overlap, there might be a
need to coordinate among themselves and agree on priority gender-sensitive areas to
bring to the attention of the UN political organs and the relevant specialized agencies
(2017, 221).
While the UN must endorse more explicitly within the organization itself a gender
equality and human rights approach as part of the preventive pillar of the WPS agenda, it
is submitted that it is equally crucial that the strategy is acknowledged when advocating
for greater engagement with the WPS agenda in regional peace and security cooperation
agreements. The Security Council recognized that ‘regional organizations are wellpositioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of
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the region’, stressed ‘the importance of a coordinated international response to causes of
conflict’, and importantly identified the link between the need for the development of
effective long-term preventive strategies and strengthening development cooperation and
assistance and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. However,
the statement makes a scant reference to the WPS agenda and avoids elaborating on how
to go about its implementation. These types of agreements could be an opportunity not
only to mainstream the WPS agenda but also to advocate for the implementation of
women’s human rights and gender equality as part of the preventive pillar of the WPS
agenda (Renzulli, 2017).
In a similar argument, according to Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth, third party
contributions, including international organizations and powers of the region, include a
variety of approaches such as mediation, peacekeeping, and many more ways of putting
pressure on the parties of wars, conflict, and peace negotiations have frequently helped in
the progress of these processes (2018, 119-121). In addition, history proves that third
parties have continuously contributed to providing more stable transitions of the civil
war-plagued countries toward normalcy and prevention of civil war recurrence (Philpott
and Power, 2010). Moreover, many policymakers and academics have emphasized the
importance of the UN’s role, other international organizations, and powers of the regions
as effective means of elevating women’s voice and legitimacy in situations in which their
national leaders or the powers involved in the processes of peace negotiations, ignore
them (Anderlini, 2007).
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Ignorance regarding women’s role in peace negotiations has been a long-lasting issue.
Throughout history, women have reacted to this issue in many ways. One of which has
been women’s antiwar movement building. In addition, women’s antiwar or peace
movements have been associated with nonviolent resistance against state authority,
pacifism, and civil disobedience (Etchart, 2015). Joy Onyesoh refers to transnational
feminist networks (hereinafter TFN) as structures organized above the national level that
unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda such as peacebuilding (2018, 438-448). Moreover, transnational feminist practices are recognized as a
shift in analysis from local, regional, and national cultures to processes and relations
across cultures that take cognizance of the local concerning the more extensive crossnational processes. Similarly, Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera emphasized the
importance of the regional or cross-border movement building and solidarities which can
be constructed by recognizing multiple identities, mutual interests, and the need for joint
action for the promotion of women’s rights and freedom (2014, 1).
Understanding peace agreements under international law
According to the American Bar Association (ABA), under the international legal
system, peace agreements are usually concluded between hostile states or governments to
end a state of war. Nevertheless, these agreements are also being reached between
governments and non-state groups and are given internationally legally binding status
as “internationalized” agreements. According to Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger
in their piece titled Do’s and Don’ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements, under
international law, peace agreements should ideally be void of ambiguity and must contain
30

necessary details. Dates and times should be precisely specified and conformed. To
prevent the breach of any provision by the parties and ensure the successful
implementation, peace agreements must also contain “provisions for monitoring”. The
existence of monitors will restrain on the actions of forces and force members under
peace agreement obligations. For this reason, almost all contemporary peace agreements
provide for monitoring the terms of the agreement (2010, 6).
It is stated in Haysom and Hottinger 2010, that it may be possible to provide for the
forces themselves either jointly or separately to monitor the agreement. Still, it is much
more common for the parties to insist on an independent agency or monitor from
independent countries. In this regard, the agreement must reflect that the parties have
jointly identified who the monitors will be or from which countries they would be drawn.
Nicholas and Julian further mention that it is more difficult to find such an agreement
after the ceasefire agreement has been concluded. It is not only the identity of the
monitors that must be agreed upon. There should be an upfront agreement on the powers
of the monitors regarding their access to relevant sites and the obligation of all parties to
assist the monitors. Such upfront agreement on the powers of the monitors may extend to
guaranteeing access not only to members of the belligerent forces, hotspots, and contact
zones but also to documents relating to the management of the armed forces (2010, 7).
In addition to the abovementioned rules of international law concerning peace
agreements, according to Oxford public international law, Pacta Sunt
Servanda (Agreements must be kept) is another important principle to be analyzed in
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cases of peace and ceasefire agreements. The pacta sunt servanda rule embodies an
elementary and universally agreed-upon principle fundamental to all legal systems
(General Principles of Law). Although its good faith (bona fide) element runs through
many aspects of international law and the legal effect of certain unilateral statements rests
on good faith, it is of prime importance for the stability of treaty relations (treaties). The
oft-quoted Latin phrase means no more than those legally binding agreements must be
performed. Based on this norm, each party is per se obliged to avoid activities that defeat
the purpose and provisions of the agreement. Therefore, the involved parties are bound to
fulfill their commitments according to the agreement. Furthermore, according to the
international legal system, the Geneva Conventions emphasize the necessity of protecting
civilians during the war. Article 3.1. of the Geneva Conventions requires the parties to
abstain from harming individuals who do not take an active role in the conflict. In
addition, Article 3.C. of the Convention prohibits any attack on buildings allocated to the
public service and historical monuments (O'Connell, 2015).

Chapter 3: Analysis Chapter
Following the second chapter, which described the context and available literature
in the area of my research, this chapter will have an analytical approach and direction by
digging deeper into the issue of Afghan women’s marginalization from the recent peace
negotiations among the US, government of Afghanistan, and the terrorist group of the
Taliban. My analysis in this chapter focuses on responding to what went wrong in the
peace process in Afghanistan and how Afghan women were left out and marginalized
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from this landmark phase of decision-making in the country. Additionally, I will connect,
compare, and highlight the connection between the theoretical frameworks referenced in
the literature review and practice, which are the collected data from different articles,
reports, the peace agreement, online platforms, etc. This chapter consists of three sections
which are: Brief History of Afghan Wars, which also includes Afghan Women’s post-war
participation in the society: between 2001 to 2021(Between War and Peace); Women’s
Peace Efforts; Afghan Women’s online peace activism, and The Failure of the Peace
Negotiations.
Brief History of Afghan Wars
Asking how men and women are differently positioned in conflict, war, and peace not
only helps in the understanding of what conflict is and how it is practiced; but also helps
to understand how gender dynamics are constituted by conflict and vice versa. However,
asking the question of how men and women are differently situated along with the
different levels of war and conflict is only helpful if this question is paired with an
exploration and explanation of how power dynamics between masculinities and
femininities work in constructing and maintaining those different positions (Cook and
Kerns, 2018). Carol highlights the importance of ‘power imbalance’ in defining the
various relationships of women and men during the war (Cohn, 2013).
During hostilities and combats, combatants and male civilians are most seriously
affected by armed conflict and face risks of death, injury, torture, summary execution,
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and mistreatment. The law of armed conflict (hereinafter LOAC)3 provides detailed
provisions dealing with all these situations. However, women experience distinctive postconflict situations as they are more likely to get exposed to sexual violence, starvation,
and other hardships during and after the conflicts. They are particularly vulnerable to the
disintegration of societal structures that accompanies armed conflict due to the endless
discrimination they experience in almost all societies, which renders them less able to
cope with its challenges. Armed conflict aggravates existing oppression experienced
globally by women. It may lead to new forms of discrimination against them, such as in
the allocation of scarce emergency relief in conflict situations where women are frequently disadvantaged, either deliberately or because their needs are not adequately
understood, and ignorance about the inclusion of their experiences of war into the peace
agreements (Gardam, 2017).
Nevertheless, the general provisions of LOAC remain gender-blind. Women’s
representation in LOAC is mainly restricted to their perceived physical and psychological
weakness and their sexual and reproductive functions. Among forty-two provisions of the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols specifically deal with
women and the effects of armed conflict, nineteen concern women as “expectant
mothers,” “maternity cases,” or “nursing mothers.” The protection of the unborn child
and small children is the rationale for many of these provisions. Women are included in

3

According to The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict: The law of armed conflict (LOAC), as its name
suggests, is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict. Its aim is to protect persons who
are not or are no longer directly participating in the hostilities and to restrict the means and methods of warfare
available to the warring parties (Ní Aoláin et al., 2018, 36-45).
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their scope as they are integral to that protection (Gardam, 2017). Accordingly, women’s
agencies, their roles as agents and advocates for preventing armed conflicts, and
peacebuilders remain overlooked. Afghan women’s disadvantaged position as a result of
continuous wars and invasions in Afghanistan is analyzed as follows:
Afghanistan’s history of wars and conflicts includes Russia’s invasion of
Afghanistan, which started on December 24, 1979; the civil war between 1989-and 1996;
the Taliban era from 1996-to 2001; and October 2001, which was the US-led invasion of
Afghanistan. Afghan women and their lives have continuously been overshadowed and
impacted by war through all these periods. During their rule between 1996 and 2001, the
Taliban perpetrated the most vicious acts of violence against women as part of a “war
against women.” Taliban deprived women of their rights to employment and education,
banned them from meaningful participation in society, and prohibited them from
appearing in public spaces without a male relative and wearing a burqa. Women accused
of breaking these restrictive rules would severely face corporal punishments (Crsreports,
2021). The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (hereinafter
RAWA), established in 1977 as one of the first feminist organizations in the country, has
addressed the Taliban’s restrictions on women and their consequences in rigorously
destroying women’s social and private lives on many levels:
“A complete ban on women's work outside the home, a complete ban on women's activity
outside the home unless accompanied by a mahram (close male relative such as a father,
brother or husband), ban on women buying from male shopkeepers, ban on women being
treated by male doctors, ban on women studying at schools, universities, or any other
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educational institution while boys were allowed to do so, forcing women to wear Burqa,
whipping, beating and verbal abuse of women who were not clothed in accordance with
Taliban rules, or of women unaccompanied by a mahram, whipping of women in public
for having non-covered ankles, public stoning of women accused of having sex outside
marriage, ban on the use of cosmetics (many women with painted nails have had fingers
cut off), ban on women talking or shaking hands with non-mahram males, ban on women
laughing loudly (no stranger should have heard a woman's voice), ban on women
wearing high heel shoes, which would make sound while walking (a man must not hear a
woman's footsteps), ban on women riding in a taxi without a mahram, and etc” (RAWA,
1).
Furthermore, now that the Taliban are ruling Afghanistan again, they have
managed to remain vague about women’s role in a Taliban-governed society. In February
2020, deputy Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani wrote that under their envisioned Islamic
system, women's rights, from the right to education to the right to work, are protected.
Skeptics note that a pledge to safeguard women's rights “according to Islam” is subjective
and echoes similar meaningless guarantees and promises made by the Taliban in their
previous time in power. Not surprisingly, in areas under the Taliban’s rule, since May
2021, they forced girls over the age of 12 to marry Taliban members, imposed multiple
layers of restrictions on women’s rights, and targeted women rights activists for femicide
(Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action 2). The recent act shutting
down secondary schools for Afghan girls is only another symptom of the old problem (Al
Jazeera, 2022).
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In the previous regime of the Taliban, by the time the Taliban fell in November
2001, years of war had taken a tremendous toll and weight on Afghanistan’s population
and the whole structure of the society. As the World Bank wrote in March 2002,
Afghanistan’s humanitarian, reconstruction, and development needs were immense. Its
economy was in a state of collapse, its infrastructure had been destroyed, its formal state
institutions were severely undermined or nonexistent, and its social indicators were the
worst in the world (World Bank, 2002). Over and above that, according to the World
Bank’s Databank, Afghans had no experience participating in elections, much less
administering them. There were no independent media, and civil society was anemic.
Life expectancy was 56 years, lower than 83 percent of countries, and the mortality rate
for children under five was in the bottom 15 percent of countries globally. In addition,
women and girls were officially banned from schools and the workforce, and only 21
percent of eligible children were enrolled in primary school. As late as 2005, 64 percent
of Afghan men and boys were illiterate, as were 82 percent of Afghan women and girls
(Bamberger, 2022).
Despite all the difficulties mentioned above, for many Afghans who had experienced
the Taliban regime, whether inside the country or as part of the diaspora, specifically
Afghan women, October 2001 was an opportunity to start building up what they lost
throughout the years of war. After the fall of the Taliban’s regime, the Afghan
government, international and local NGOs, and the UN have employed various
techniques and innovative strategies to help empower Afghan women. These bodies
established fundamental structures and institutions that attempt to build women’s
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capacity, highlight their advocacies, and engage them in the political process in postwar
Afghanistan. More importantly, Afghan women themselves had taken responsibility for
lifting themselves and other women from the downward spiral of every facet of their
lives. Among other efforts, the Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights was an important step
that women took for themselves (Afghan Women's Network, 2022). On September 5,
2003, Afghan women demanded that these rights should not only be secured in the
constitution but also needs to be implemented:
1. Mandatory education for women through secondary school and opportunities for
all women for higher education.
2. Provision of up-to-date health services for women with particular attention to
reproductive rights.
3. Protection and security for women: the prevention and criminalization of sexual
harassment against women publicly and in the home, sexual abuse of women and
children, domestic violence, and “bad blood-price” (the use of women as
compensation for crimes by one family against another).
4. Freedom of speech.
5. Freedom to vote and run for election to office.
6. Equal pay for equal work.
7. Right to financial independence and ownership of property.
8. Right to participate fully and to the highest levels in the economic and
commercial life of the country.
9. Mandatory provision of economic opportunities for women.
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10. Equal representation of women in the Loya Jirga and Parliament.
11. Full inclusion of women in the judiciary system.
12. Guarantee of all constitutional rights to widows, disabled women, and orphans.
13. Full rights of inheritance.
14. Trials of war criminals in international criminal courts and the disempowerment
of warlords.
The legal gains made for Afghan women in this period were impressive, particularly
when examined against the backdrop of women’s complete subjugation during the
Taliban period, even though lack of the rule of law was one of the most significant issues
in Afghanistan and the implementation of the protection laws for women was
questionable (Sultan, 2005). But solely the recognition of women’s rights and the
existence of these laws, including but not limited to the Law on Elimination of Violence
against women and Anti-Harassment Law for Women and Children, were huge successes
made by women in the process of recognizing and institutionalizing women’s rights.
(Sultan, 2005).
In the past 20 years, life for many people in Afghanistan improved. Among others,
women have seen some of the most significant changes due to their efforts and hard
work. The fall of the Taliban regime allowed some considerable change and progress in
terms of women's rights and education. According to the world bank, back in 1999, there
was not a single girl enrolled in a primary and secondary school. Furthermore, by 2003,
2.4 million girls, who are 6% of the school-age girls, were in school. By 2017, that figure
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changed to around 3.5 million, which was 39%, and around a third of students at public
and private universities were women (The Visual Journalism Team, 2021). As mentioned
above, now that the country is under the Taliban’s rule once again, they claim that they
no longer oppose girls' education. Still, according to Aljazeera news, Taliban officials in
the areas they control have not allowed girls to attend school past puberty (Aljazeera,
2022).
Women’s activism and efforts had also taken them far regarding employment and
inclusion in society. According to UN/World Bank/Amnesty International, from 2001 to
2021, women have also been participating in public life, holding political office, and
pursuing business opportunities. More than 1,000 Afghan women had started their
businesses by 2019 - all previously prohibited activities under the Taliban. As a result of
women’s activism and collective actions, the constitution was changed to say women
should hold at least 27% of seats in the lower house of parliament. In July, they held 69
of the 249 seats (The Visual Journalism Team, 2021).
Finally, it can be said that in the period between war and peace, Afghan women
made sure to study, work, and build their capacities for being included in the society,
politics, and social life of the country. They demonstrated that their participation could
meaningfully contribute to promoting democracy. Trends were emerging to illustrate the
promise and potential of women’s full participation in Afghanistan’s post-conflict
reconstruction and, specifically, governance. Women in Afghanistan have been helping
counter the tendency towards political extremism, fostering recognition for ethnic
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minorities and minority rights, contributing to the fight for moderation and human rights,
providing critical services to promote development, and ensuring the productive capacity
of Afghanistan by building on their experience in meeting basic needs even during
extended periods of conflict (Sultan, 2005).
Peace Buildings and End of the International Military Presence
Afghanistan’s recent so-called peace process started in 2018 when Trump’s
administration announced its intention for a sudden and complete withdrawal of the
United States troops from Afghanistan. The proposal to initiate peace negotiations
between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban had since then shaped new
discussions around peace, stability, and war. The decision to implement an urgent peace
between the Taliban and the Afghan government created questions, uncertainties, and
fears (Fetrat, 2020). These uncertainties and fears were particularly strong and vivid
among women, specifically those who had actively fought for women’s rights during the
past two decades. United States decision also flagged crucial debates on the protection of
women’s rights, principles of human rights, rights of minorities, and achievements of the
last two decades upon the Taliban’s return. These topics were explicitly the center of
focus and discussion at national and international levels as Afghan woman’s image
shrouded in the burqa had played a leading role in various public arguments seeking to
justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks and fed the
savior ego of the “white men” for “saving brown women from brown men (the Taliban)”
(Abu-Lughod, 2002; Kevin, 2005).
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This rhetorical construction of Afghan women as objects of knowledge
legitimized U.S. military intervention under the ideology of "liberation" at the same time
that it overshadowed the root causes of structural violence, oppression, and continuous
conflict in Afghanistan. It has been emphasized that the pursuit of gender security must
always be backed up by considering the diverse ways in which the neocolonialism of
western discourses about third-world women, in this case, Afghan women, creates the
epistemological conditions for material harm (Kevin, 2005). Allowing the Taliban to
have an official office in Doha-Qatar, and then the leverage to negotiate with the United
States while the government of Afghanistan was excluded from the process, giving the
ideologically strident militant group a public venue to appear as “very well-dressed
people, with smartphones, speaking diplomatically in front of the international media.”
For the Taliban, it offered a glimpse of international legitimacy and granted the right to
negotiate and justify their agendas in the name of resisting the Afghanistan government’s
political opposition (Kirby, 2021).
Peace talks and conversations around that also incited conversations about
women’s participation in and support of the national peace effort. People of Afghanistan
and specifically Afghan women, started to flag that women’s both quality and quantitybased participation in the peace negotiations is crucial to ensure their effective
implementation, durability, and sustainability. Between 1990 and 2014, 130 peace
agreements were signed, with only 13 peace agreements with women in a signatory
authority, all of which lasted longer than the agreements only signed by men.
Additionally, the involvement of women in peace processes resulted in a more robust
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integration of human rights, transitional justice, national reconciliation, and subsequent
women’s participation in the decision-making processes at the local and national levels
(Krause, 2018).
A research report by Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and funded by the
UN Women found that Afghan women have always been prepared and willing to
participate in the recent national peace effort. They mentioned the importance of
following training and seminars conducted by local and international organizations. This
research presents the findings from 77 qualitative interviews with women and men in
Kabul, Bamiyan, Balkh, and Nangarhar provinces selected to represent as widely as
possible the Afghan population. To understand the issue deeply, the qualitative data of
this research was collected through in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key
informants, both men and women in the governmental and non-governmental
organizations, and focus group discussions with women (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori,
2020).
Women with a political background and experience in peace-related issues were
the primary respondents of this study. The study also shows that male and female
religious scholars further debunked the traditional religious arguments against women’s
participation in the national peace effort. Finally, looking at the past, the participants of
this report have highlighted numerous cases of women’s involvement in conflict
resolution and peace negotiations. Most respondents of this study believed that the role of
women in the national peace effort was essential. They thus demanded that the
international community and the government give them an opportunity and a meaningful
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role. However, very little has been done under the governmental structure for the peace
effort. Despite relatively improved security and an increase in women’s participation in
decision-making, women still lack a substantial role in the political processes and the
national peace efforts such as the recent one (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori, 2020).
In early 2019, the United States resumed its direct and exclusive negotiations with
the Taliban, to reach an agreement on a joint framework for a future peace deal in
Afghanistan and inter-Afghan negotiations. Although debate continued over the size and
duration of the US military presence in Afghanistan and the inclusion of the terrorist
group the Taliban in the government of Afghanistan, what systematically fell in and out
of the headlines was the topic of women’s presence in these peacebuilding efforts
(Steiner, 2019). These significant talks between the Taliban and the US government
resulted in a draft framework for peace, but the most controversial part of these
negotiations was that they excluded the government of Afghanistan; and the general
public, especially Afghan women, families of the victims of war crimes, and other
minorities. One of the most extensive critiques of the US negotiations with the Taliban
was their exclusive agreement which had become a worrying sign for women’s rights in
the country given the lack of any indications that these rights and the achievements of the
last two decades will be safeguarded (Cook, 2020).
The Failure of the Peace Negotiations
I’m arguing that Afghan women were put in a situation to be impacted by the
quality and quantity-based discrimination in the recent peace process with the Taliban.
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According to the text of the Doha Agreement4 and the Joint Declaration,5 there has been
no indication or reference to safeguarding Afghan women’s rights and rights of
minorities, including women in the process, and preventing the ongoing violation of the
human rights in the country. Only as a formality, few women were included in the
process of peace negotiation one hardly could expect them to resist a whole room of
people like the Taliban and be able to defend women’s rights effectively and
meaningfully on behalf of the entire country. Moreover, I’m emphasizing that Afghan
women’s activism and advocacies for having a meaningful role in the process of peace
were systematically ignored by all parties, including the international community, which
played a double standard in this regard, and thus women’s voices were left unheard. Also,
during the process of peace negotiation, not only the importance of women’s role was
ignored, but also there was an imminent underestimation of regional powers’ roles, such
as Iran, Pakistan, and China, in disrupting or strengthening the process of peace and
women’s role in this process in Afghanistan.
Following SCR 1325 resolution, UN member states, including Afghanistan,
intended to take practical steps to adhere to their women’s rights obligations and
contribute to maintaining peace and security. To this end and implement UNSCR 1325,
the Government of Afghanistan developed a National Action Plan. Afghanistan’s NAP
on SCR 1325 women, peace, and security is designed to address the challenges women

4

Agreement For Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Taliban and the United States, https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.
5
A Declaration Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and The United States for Bringing Peace to
Afghanistan, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf.
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faced in the aftermath of war and conflict in this country. This document has been called
the best tool for realizing the resolution's objectives, which aim to increase women’s
participation in peace processes and the security sector and address issues around their
protection in these processes (NAP, 2015).
Before the country's collapse into the Taliban’s hands, according to Afghanistan’s
NAP 2015-2022, it was believed that despite the challenges, the status of women has
improved since 2001. While there was more to be achieved, increased access to
education, healthcare, justice, employment, freedom of expression, and other
fundamental rights had made it possible for Afghan women to participate more in public
and political life. However, even then, the existent statistics showed that women
remained considerably excluded from the political life and decision‐making processes
regarding their security and well‐being. Thus, women’s participation in official peacebuilding initiatives, the peace process, and security sector reform has highly and
systematically been overlooked and limited (NAP, 2015, 4-5). While Afghanistan NAP’s
main goal was to increase the effective participation of women in the decision‐making
levels of the security agencies and the peace processes, among the 70 members of the
previous High Peace Council of Afghanistan, only 9 of them were women, which highly
shows the lack of a fair and meaningful inclusion of women and highlights the question
of efficiency of SCR 1325 and Afghanistan’s NAP in implementation of it (High Peace
Council, 2017).
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Moreover, the High Council of National Reconciliation (Hereinafter HCNR),6
which was decided to be led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, had a consultative role. This
council is supposed to consult the negotiator team to talk with the Taliban. Basically, it
meant HCNR would give the redline of the negotiation to the negotiator team. Observing
the structure, goals, and responsibility of the HCNR raises questions about the role of
women in this council. Since this council consisted of all jihadi political parties, a
concern would come on the issue of women’s role and participation in national peace
efforts. As all political parties have always been male-led, at the time, a woman politician
and women’s rights activist made the following observation: “It seems that still President
Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah have a disagreement on the division of power,
and women’s participation in peace is not their priority. The main focus seems to be only
on parties' ethnic, regional, and political participation. If they assign a woman in a key
position in this council, it will be based on issues I mentioned, not based on women’s
participation in peace efforts” (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori, 2020, 7).
More importantly, women’s concern over their participation in the HCNR was
affirmed by a former candidate for the parliamentary election who said that women’s
concerns regarding their role in the HCNR had been confirmed. She mentioned that
Women had a role in peace efforts, but their roles were not meaningful. Thinking about
the HCNR, they demanded that two of the council's deputies should be women. But

6

The political issue of the country had put the intra-afghan peace talks into a deadlock, so finally, after the agreement
between former President Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah established the high council of national
reconciliation for smoothing the difficulties (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori, 2020).
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unfortunately, based on reports from the recognized media such as BBC, one could see
that people who had been engaged in the war were members of the HCNR, such as
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and others. Up until before the collapse of the country, one could
see no representatives of women, victims of war, and civil society in this council.
According to those mentioned above, the strong impact of political parties on the HCNR
had made women’s role fragile in national peace efforts (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori,
2020).
In addition, the failure of the peace efforts in Afghanistan didn’t only stop at the
abovementioned pre-peace negotiation stages, but also women and their role were
ignored during the process itself too. Among others, a three-day conference between the
government of Afghanistan and the Taliban was launched in Moscow-Russia. Still,
Afghan human rights activists were alarmed that the delegates included just one female
representative. Habiba Sarabi, an activist, and politician, was the only female delegate on
the 12-member team representing the Afghan government and political leaders in
Moscow. The 10-member delegation sent by the Taliban had none. The physical
representation of Sarabi in that dialogue did not mean that she was given an equal
opportunity to discuss and represent the demands of Afghan women. The Taliban
approved Sarabi’s participation in the dialogue. Therefore, there was an obvious power
imbalance in the room (The Guardian, 2021). In this conference, Sarabi addressed a vast
circular table of male counterparts and stated that: “why should I be the only woman in
the room? We have not been part of the war, but we can certainly contribute to peace,”
according to a tweet from a fellow negotiator that she shared. Sarabi’s sole existence had
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been “permitted” by the Taliban, yet her participation in the conversation would have
been denied without this group’s approval (Al Jazeera, 2021).
Besides, there are many individual stories of Afghan feminists and women’s
rights defenders that comprehensively criticize the lack of women’s presence in political
and decision-making processes, specifically the recent peace process in Afghanistan due
to the lack of the rule of law, and weak political intention, power structures, etc. Among
others, Farahnaz Frotan, an Afghan feminist and Journalist, who recently fled her country
afterlife threats by the Taliban, in an interview with The New York Times on April 21,
2021, began her story by saying that: “as men continue to bicker over the future and
control of Afghanistan, I have already lost my home and my country. I worked in Kabul
as a television journalist for 12 years and finally left in November 2020 after threats to
my life.” She further stated that she had to leave the country because the Taliban’s vision
of Afghanistan had no place and space for her body and personality (The New York
Times, 2021).
As a woman who thrived to build her capacity over the last 20 years despite
political instability, conflict, the heightened risks, immense challenges, and the everpresent threat of gender-based violence resulting from wars and conflicts, she expected to
be counted as an agent of peace and change. Still, the experience of encounter with
Suhail Shaheen, the spokesperson for the Taliban during the peace negotiations in DohaQatar says otherwise. Frotan added that she approached Mr. Shaheen for an interview. He
couldn’t hide his disdain at her presence and set about ignoring her, but she didn’t budge
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and refused to be invisible and continued to direct her questions to him. According to her,
Afghan women have always lived with a sense of being invisible. Their voices go
unheard in workplaces or meetings like this, and their existence barely gets recognized.
She further stated, "This encounter filled me with rage and terror. When he finally
answered one of my questions, his eyes moved in every direction but mine: he examined
the walls, the carpet on the floor, the chairs, the door. He couldn’t look at me, even while
I stood in front of him. It was as if he saw me as an embodiment of sin and evil. I felt
unsafe, even in a room full of people, thousands of miles away from Afghanistan” (The
New York Times, 2021).
Frotan further criticized the lack of women’s presence in decision-making
processes by stating that “the wars that men started and fought in Afghanistan have
disproportionately devastated women's lives. Yet the compositions of the peace
delegations from Afghanistan reveal that women are barely considered worthy of having
a say. It is this knowledge and the memory of the Taliban rule in the 1990s that make
Afghan women scared for their future. Moreover, the Taliban have come close to
achieving their goals through the use of force and military supremacy. In Frotan’s
opinion, the United States couldn’t win the war in Afghanistan, even after two decades of
fighting the Taliban, and that is why they entered into negotiations with them. That
decision offered the Taliban greater legitimacy than they had ever enjoyed, which is a
scary warning and trauma triggering to any woman living in Afghanistan (The New York
Times, 2021).
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Farahnaz Frotan is not the only Afghan woman who raised her voice and warned
about her experience of marginalization from the process of peace. Shahrzad Akbar’s
statement about the Taliban’s attitude toward women’s rights during the peace
negotiations and talks says a lot. Ms. Akbar, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, was present in the inter-Afghan peace dialogues on July 7-8, 2019, in Doha.
In an interview, Ms. Akbar affirmed the systematic ignorance about women’s role in the
peace process by stating that:
“In Doha, I witnessed their arrogant unwillingness to compromise. Their answers
to legitimate questions from the Afghan delegation on women's rights, governance
models, elections, international treaties to which Afghanistan is a signatory, and other
key issues, were vague and well-rehearsed. They did not show any willingness to enter
into a fruitful debate which was a worrying sign for their willingness to compromise on
some of these key topics in future intra-Afghan negotiations” (Fetrat, 2020, 47-49).
In October 2021, Amnesty International conducted interviews with 16
Afghan women who discussed their advocacies for being included in the process of peace
and fears for their future in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s rule (Amnesty International
5). Of the interviewees, Elaha Sahel, a journalist and women's rights defender, expressed
her dissatisfaction with the process of peace and the way that the government of
Afghanistan and the international community dealt with it by stating that:
“When the peace talks started two years ago, Afghan women kept calling on the
international community to ensure that women’s rights were protected during and after
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the peace process. Unfortunately, no one listened to us. Westerners kept stamping us with
the brands of ‘elite women’ and not being truly representative of Afghan women. They
did so to silence us and make sure that we were not heard. We were betrayed by the
people who told us they were here because of Afghan women. In the past two months, we
heard very little criticism from the international community towards the Taliban's
conduct against women, which is upsetting” (Amnesty International, 2021, 13).
Shukria Barakzai, a former member of parliament and Afghanistan’s former
ambassador, was also interviewed by Amnesty International. As one of the experienced
politicians involved in drafting several articles concerning the elimination of violence
against women and fighting to have women, she criticized the peace process and
exclusion of women in this process by stating that: “I never had trust in the peace process
[between the Taliban and the previous Afghan government]. The government had a
fragile position, and the Taliban had a lot of leverage because of the recognition they had
[from the US]” (Amnesty International, 2021, 21-23). Finally, despite all the tensions and
challenges, the peace agreement consisted of four sections between the US and the
Taliban, which was eventually signed on February 29, 2020, in Doha. To point out the
most apparent problems, the government of Afghanistan was not a part of this agreement.
Afghan women and their human rights; and accountability for violation of human rights
and humanitarian principles were missing; there was no indication of safeguarding the
human rights of the victims of war crimes; and finally, having a cease-fire was called as
only an option to be considered but not a must and a requirement for institutionalizing the
process of peace (The Agreement for Bringing Peace, 2020).
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The intentional negligence and ignorance of the crucial demands of Afghans
by the parties of these talks led to disappointments and distrust of the people of
Afghanistan and specifically Afghan women towards US Foreign Policy, the Taliban’s
intention of having a meaningful and sustainable peace, and the level of strength in
Afghanistan government’s statements and actions. On the other hand, despite these issues
and challenges, Afghan women continued their efforts to revive their role as peacemakers
and agents of change. It is worth mentioning that realization of the power imbalance
within Afghan society, the painful past with the Taliban, the growing distrust towards the
Afghan government, and US foreign policy led them to take more action and call for
solidarity among women in this particular period (Fetrat, 2020). These efforts have
shown signs of shifting perceptions of women’s expanding role within the societies and
could signal more progress toward a broader gender equality vision across the country.
But a national-level peacebuilding agenda will need to address women’s rights in a
systematic, structured, and meaningful way, one that both takes into account the specific
post-conflict needs of women and recognizes the roles they can play in advancing the
country’s security by being included to the process (Steiner, 2019).
Afghan Women’s Digital Activism for Peace
For decades, Afghan women have been at the forefront of calls for
recognition of the gendered nature of peace and conflict and for the protection of
women’s rights. However, stereotypes such as the permanently subordinated Afghan
woman walking through dusty hills, caged in the oppressive blue burka, or the
strong vocal woman speaking out for women’s rights in only a headscarf is
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slightly pulled back, are all too common (Rivas and Safi, 2022). The colonial resonance
of the use of Afghan women’s position in the society as a constant trope of the rationale
for the US-led invasion to “save Afghan women” without including them and their
experiences in the process; presumption of their need to be talked on their behalf; and for
ignorance in regards to their role and impact on the process of peace as active agents
highly needs to be interrogated. It is precisely because there are many stories that show
Afghan women advocating for ending war and promoting peace as active agents of
change via different platforms. Among others, online platform/social media has become
one of the prominent ones for their activism and advocacies.
The increasing popularity of online platforms/social media has led to increased
social and feminist activism happening throughout social media sites. Some of these
social actions have been organized by groups such as non‐profit organizations, and others
have been initiated by individuals who were victims of those social issues or are simply
passionate about bringing social change and helping in promoting social justice (Li et al.,
2020). Studies show that feminists have increasingly turned to digital technologies and
social media platforms to dialogue, network, and organize against contemporary sexism
and misogyny. Digital spaces are often highly creative sites where the public can
simultaneously learn about, intervene, and become involved in promoting and advocating
for their rights7 (Mendes et al., 2018). Similarly, Afghan women have been relying
heavily on virtual/online platforms to share their experiences, mobilize, and organize

7

Internationally, the #MeToo movement in 2017 was one of the strongest and most high-profile examples of digital
feminist activism that institutionalized the power of online platforms and social media in expanding feminist activism
and social justice (Mendes et al. 237).
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their feminist advocacies. Their activism and advocacies on social media have had a
growing line despite the insecurities, the Taliban’s threats, war, invasion, and many more
reasons to prevent them from advocating for their rights and beliefs. Among these, I can
point out to widespread and well-recognized online campaign “#whereismyname?” This
campaign was initiated by young Afghan women and women’s rights activists in 2017
(Mashal, 2017). Participants of this campaign were advocating for a change in the custom
of eliminating women’s names.8 Two prominent online activism of Afghan women for
peace include “MyRedLine, a social media campaign,” and “Together Stronger, a
WhatsApp group for feminist organizing around the topic of peace.”
MyRedLine
MyRedLine is a Social Media campaign that aimed to bring the voices of the
Afghan people, particularly their RedLines, during the recent peace negotiations between
the Taliban, the United States, and the Afghan Government to the fore. According to this
social media/online campaign, the Taliban had only ruled Afghanistan for five years;
however, in that period, they managed to leave a lasting impression on the lives of the
Afghan people. One of the purposes of this campaign was to re-affirm the fact that every
Afghan can recall at least one terrible, frightening experience from the years under the
Taliban rule that they don’t wish to revisit or be thrown back into it as a result of an

8

Based on the ruling beliefs in Afghanistan, many Afghan men are reluctant to say the names of their sisters, wives, or
mothers in public. Women are generally only referred to as the mother, daughter, or sister of the eldest male in their
family, and Afghan law dictates that only the father's name should be recorded on a birth certificate. The activists’
aimed both to challenge women to reclaim their most basic identity and to break the deep-rooted taboo that prevents
men from mentioning their female relatives’ names in public. This online campaign had taken so much attention and
widespread recognition on social media and other online platforms as much as the Afghanistan Central Civil
Registration Authority (Accra) was looking into the possibility of amending the country's Population Registration Act
to allow women to have their names on their children's ID cards and birth certificates (Nowrouzi, 2020).
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unstructured peace deal. Thus, they want to be the platform the people of Afghanistan
and specifically, Afghan women, can talk about their demands from the process of peace
and be involved as active agents of peace in decision making (The Voice of Afghanistan
for Sustainable Peace, 2022).
Hundreds of thousands of Afghan women have joined an online campaign,
#MyRedLine, to speak about the freedoms and rights they are not willing to give up in
the name of peace with the Taliban. Moreover, a hashtag was launched by Farahnaz
Forotan, #MyRedLine Campaign Ambassador, with the help of the UN Women's office
in Kabul. With this online campaign, Forotan aimed at raising awareness for Afghan
decision-makers to know that peace cannot be achieved at the expense of the rights,
freedoms, and happiness of the nation's women (Najibullah, 2019). She writes: “As a
journalist, I am privileged to listen to what people have to say, to know what matters to
them, to understand what they need. And from this privileged position, I can say that the
Afghan citizens want peace they can all enjoy. And this is how this campaign
“MyRedLine” came about” (#Myredline, UN Women, Asia-Pacific, 2022).
In this campaign, activists created videos from all around Afghanistan amid
U.S. efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban, featuring several young Afghan women
and men describing their “red lines,” often regarding democratic staples like education,
freedom of speech, and gender equality. In addition, Forotan, herself too, shared her red
line as a journalist and advocate of freedom of expression. She courageously stated that
her red line for the process of peace is her “pen and freedom of expression,” two crucial
things in her life that she wouldn’t want to be sacrificed while negotiating peace with the
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Taliban (Najibullah, 2019). Virtual feminist activism has proved to build solidarity and
support and transform into a feminist consciousness amongst hashtag participants, which
allows them to understand the concept in a broader context and connect it to the root
causes and structural oppressions rather than only focusing on personal problems
(Mendes et al., 2018). Women using #MyRedLine reiterated their demands and connected
their past experiences to structural systems of oppression, discrimination, and patriarchy
by expressing their fear regarding the Taliban’s possible return to power which will be a
strong point of threat to the freedoms of Afghan women attained following the collapse
of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Najibullah, 2019). This campaign initially started as a
small initiative on social media and became a nationwide phenomenon that offered
Afghan women a platform to share their concerns about the return of the Taliban back
power (#Myredline, UN Women, Asia-Pacific, 2022).
Together Stronger
In this section, I will discuss the collective work of Afghan women during the
process of peace via a WhatsApp group chat named “Together Stronger.” At the
beginning of 2021, I was introduced, invited, and included in this group chat by my
friend Zahra Sharifi (Alias: for security reasons), a women & peace activist who supports
women-led peace initiatives in Afghanistan. This group was created in March 2019 by a
group of Afghan women (their names aren’t shared for security reasons). From the
beginning of the time that Afghan women felt being sidelined and ignored in the process
of peace, this group has brought its attention to this topic by arranging and directing so
many different women-led direct actions, writing and sharing petitions and statements,
and holding meetings to discuss the needs of women during and after the period of peace
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negotiations with the Taliban. It is worth mentioning that this group chat consists of 131all women members who are both inside of Afghanistan and parts of the diaspora
working for the same goals and purposes: uplifting women’s voices; and advocating for
institutionalizing their place in the process of peace for their future (Together Stronger
WhatsApp group, 2019). In addition, the general “Together Stronger” WhatsApp group is
then divided into smaller focus and working groups, including but not limited to “media
working group” and “advocacy working group.” According to the description of the
groups, women are being involved in these working groups based on their specialty and
profession to work on establishing a solid base for the causes they work for. (Together
Stronger WhatsApp group, 2019).
This WhatsApp group chat is a virtual space for activism, resistance, organizing,
support, and a platform for mobilization during and after the process of peace. Through
this WhatsApp group and platforms like this, Afghan women worldwide are trying to
present a different narrative and story of their advocacies for women’s rights. Thus, they
claim space, subjectivity, agency, and influence and demand their voices to be heard
through their activism and collective action projects. Among other efforts, this group
coordinated and distributed petitions such as “Supporting Afghan Women's demand for a
just peace guaranteeing the rights of all people,” which was accessed on August 2021 and
was created by Guissou Jahangiri, the Executive Director of Armanshahr and OPEN
ASIA, to the human rights defenders and civil society around the world (Jahangiri, 2021).
In this collective work, Afghan women strongly raised their voices. They claimed
the space for people to hear them by stating that: “hopes for a better life, which had
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emerged after the continuous years of war political turmoil, were again destroyed with
war and occupation. The flames of war have been reignited throughout the country, and
the Taliban has re-emerged as a result of America’s irresponsible departure, the weakness
of the central government, and inaction or support for the Taliban by neighboring
countries, leaving the future and lives of women under serious threat once again”
(Jahangiri, 2021). They further courageously criticized the peace talks process and
claimed that alongside the war and increasing violence, rather than being centered around
improving the situation in Afghanistan, the peace talks moved toward legitimizing
numerous perpetrators of war crimes and human rights catastrophes in Afghanistan. The
voices of independent Afghan society and the women who are being lashed, stoned, and
forced to marry the Taliban combatants haven’t been heard during the peace talks. The
negotiations do not include much on peace and appear more as bargaining for a power
grab and political positions (Jahangiri, 2021).
Women have an important role in expanding the agenda of the peace process by
bringing their perspectives and voices which have stem from the experiences they are the
closest to, raising the voices of the victims of wars, and building trust among the parties
of the negotiations (Anderlini, 2007). Similarly, in this collective work, members of the
WhatsApp group not only emphasized gender equality among citizens by stating that the
protection of women’s rights should be a unanimously agreed guarantee of all parties
during any peace talks but also demanded from the United Nations Security Council and
the parties of the peace talks to consider an immediate ceasefire; refrainment from using
military tactics and strategies that endanger the lives of civilians; accountability for past
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and current war crimes and atrocities; provision of the election for political change;
elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against women, freedom of
expression; etc. which highly points to the expanding role of women during the process
of peace (Jahangiri, 2021).
This WhatsApp group has been working on many other different collective projects
to institutionalize women's voices during the process of peace and after the Taliban’s
insurgency took over Afghanistan in August 2021. As a result of these women’s
collective actions, they integrated some of the most essential documents regarding
women and peace, including but not limited to the civil society declaration of the
people’s uprising in Afghanistan; this document was accessed on 10 September 2021 and
covered the nature of women’s protests in Kabul and all over the country for demanding
the right to be included in the peace negotiation and after-peace talks and negotiations
(Civil society declaration, 2021).
In addition, a letter was sent to the Minister of South Asia and the Commonwealth,
UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development. This letter was incorporated by the
International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) on September 15, 2021. It covered
the conversation around the fact that Afghan women themselves and alone risk their lives
to question and challenge the Taliban’s notion and ideology of culture and religion
regarding women’s situation and their place in the society and public life (ICAN, 2021).
Finally, they prepared a letter to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This
letter was organized by the Together Stronger WhatsApp group, AWSDC, Afghan
Women for Change, the Liberty Coalition, Women Commission of the Afghan Global
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Diaspora Council, and Afghan Youth Empowerment on 20th December 2021. It covered
the 19th December 2021, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statements over the
fact that: “Imran Khan made statements in an international forum on why the current
regressive policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, especially towards girls and women
during and after the peace talks, must be accepted by the OIC and the international
community. His statement was yet again a reminder of the country's strategic depth since
the Cold War, where a policy of dividing Afghans along ideology, ethnicity, or religion is
at the core of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Women activists in this letter re-claimed
their agency, involvement, and entitlement to the situation of the country by calling upon
the OIC to take note of such irresponsible statements from the Prime Minister during the
sensitive times of the peace talks and the collapse of the country; and sincerely hoped that
they do not become the basis of the OIC's outlook on Afghanistan (AWSDC et al., 2021).
In addition, as a conclusion point about the importance of these online platforms
concerning women’s activism around the topic of peace and women’s rights, I want to
refer to Mary Akrami’s statement in one of her interviews. She is one of the board
members of the “Together Stronger” and the creator of “Our voice for our future”
WhatsApp groups. She proudly contended that these groups have now changed to
women’s coalitions and platforms of organizing for peace. As an example, she then
added: “During the Moscow peace dialogues, women were not consulted for
representation, to show our objection, through this group, we managed to have four
massive meetings with women in one week. Around 70 women who are in the leading
positions in every relevant sector, starting from the Human Rights commission to all the
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local organizations, the Minister of Women’s affairs, and the three other female
ministers, took part. Thereby we announced women’s statement regarding women’s
representation in the peace talks in Moscow” (Fetrat, 2020).
Thus, the abovementioned examples of women’s tireless efforts, advocacies, and
activism for being included in the process of peace through online/digital platforms.
These efforts are parts of a larger story for Afghan women’s advocacies regarding
women’s rights and specifically the peace process as active agents, not only “agency-less
victims,” highlighting experiences of Afghan women’s advocacies as active agents of
peace.
International Human rights Law and Peace
As mentioned in the literature review chapter, third party contributions (including
but not limited to the international community, international organizations such as the
UN, other powers involved such as the USA and Russia in the case of Afghanistan, and
powers of the region such as Iran, Pakistan, and China) include a variety of approaches
such as mediation, peacekeeping, and many more ways for putting pressure on the parties
of war and peace negotiations. It is also worth mentioning that these kinds of
contributions (if following the proper strategies of peace-building) can effectively bring
fair and just processes of peace, which highly emphasize elevating women’s voices,
specifically in cases in which their national leaders ignore them. I believe this kind of
contribution could have been efficient for providing a smooth transition of Afghanistan
toward peace, giving meaningful representation to Afghan women during peace
negotiations, and raising the question of accountability for war crimes that have happened
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throughout the conflict in this country. Thus, in this section, I will briefly touch upon the
role of the international community, regional powers, and structure of the US-Taliban
peace under the lens of international law. Finally, I will focus on how transnational
feminist networks can help Afghan women and their causes.
Role of the International Community and Powers of The Region
The world powers have always shown great interest in Afghanistan due to its
strategic position. The Soviet Union and the United States are examples of foreign
invasions in Afghanistan (Mustafa et al., 2020). Among other countries involved in
Afghanistan’s process of peace, including Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Turkey,
hosted a peace summit for Afghanistan from April 24 to May fourth to start efforts to
sketch out a possible political settlement. According to a news article from Al Jazeera
accessed on April 13, 2021, Turkey’s foreign ministry stated that the Afghan government
and the Taliban would attend the 10-day summit in Turkey. But the Taliban later said that
they would not participate in any summits on Afghanistan’s future until all foreign forces
leave the country. The meeting would include the United Nations and Qatar to advance
stalled Doha talks for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. The overriding
objective of the Istanbul Conference on Afghanistan’s Peace Process was to accelerate
and complement the continuing intra-Afghan negotiations in Doha on achieving a just
and durable political settlement. The conference is supposed to focus on helping the
negotiating parties reach a set of shared, foundational principles that reflect an agreed
vision for a future Afghanistan, a roadmap to a future political settlement, and an end to
the conflict. However, the process was stalled entirely because of the Taliban’s
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unwillingness to attend the summit. Afghanistan’s High Council for National
Reconciliation, an independent negotiating body, established in 2010, is expected to
present its own set of proposals after consulting different political parties and civil
society members. Officials were worried that violence in the country would surge if an
agreement was not reached soon before September 11, the date for withdrawal of the
troops from Afghanistan (Al Jazeera, 2021).
In her interview with the BBC Persian, Malalai Habibi, an Afghan analyst on
peace and international relations, identifies the pivotal role of regional powers such as
Pakistan, Iran, India, China, and Russia in both peace and the continuation of the wars
and conflicts in Afghanistan. She explained that Turkey’s peace summit was one of the
most critical steps in the negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the
Taliban. However, there were many challenges and intentional shortcomings, such as the
uncertainty of the Turkey summit’s date and time, the unclear nature of the women’s
presence both quantitively and qualitatively in this summit, and the focus of the Taliban
on only releasing the Taliban’s prisoners by the government of Afghanistan. Habibi
points to these challenges as considerable barriers to the summit's success and highly
impactful on the people of Afghanistan’s expectations regarding the outcomes of the
peace talks (BBC Persian, 2021).
Accordingly, it is evident that minimizing the USA’s influence in Afghanistan
and the region has been the primary motivation for the engagement of these powers in
Afghanistan’s peace-building process. China has participated in several world meetings
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in Afghanistan. However, China had no vast experience in resolving disputes on the
international level, and the Chinese tilt and tendency towards Pakistan and its intentions
regarding Afghanistan’s peace affected these mediations (Mustafa et al., 2020).
Additionally, in The Taliban: A New Proxy for Iran in Afghanistan, the authors have
identified and discussed the double standard of the theocratic regime of Iran in Afghan
peace processes through a contradictory policy. On the one hand, Iran has established its
political-economic and cultural ties with the government of Afghanistan. On the other
hand, it has kept its ties with the hard-core Taliban militants (Mustafa et al. 425). The
Iranian regime also started to support the Taliban due to their deteriorated relationship
with the USA to minimize America’s influence in Afghanistan. (Mustafa et al., 2020,
429).
As the next influential neighboring country, Pakistan involves strongly in the
matters of Afghanistan’s war and peace. Ahmed Rashid addresses Pakistan's double play
with the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan (2008, 20-40). Afghanistan has
always been the battleground for a proxy war. In this proxy war, Pakistan has been a vital
ally of the Taliban’s insurgency before 9/11 and has continued to back the Taliban
insurgents since then. Though Pakistani officials have denied funding the Taliban’s
movement on several occasions, there is overwhelming evidence that the Taliban
continue to receive haven and military and financial assistance in Pakistan. In addition,
Pakistan’s historical record of intervention in Afghanistan has caused a general distrust
among Afghans (Dormandy, 2007).
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Finally, in early 2019, former Afghan “Mujahedeen” leaders met in Moscow to
discuss matters of war and peace with the Taliban. For Russia, this was the culmination
of a long evolution from being a marginal post-Soviet player into a prominent diplomatic
actor in Afghanistan and a supporter of a negotiated settlement involving the Taliban.
While secondary to the US–Taliban talks held since 2018 and to the official inter-Afghan
talks that started in September 2020, Moscow-sponsored regional peace consultations and
informal inter-Afghan dialogue merit attention in terms of how they contributed to the
search for peace in Afghanistan and fit into Russia’s broader foreign policy patterns
(Stepanova, 2021). Russia has already enjoyed good working relations with Pakistan,
China, India, and Iran: these powers needed to play an influential role in the political
settlement to be made in Afghanistan (Stepanova, 2021). Moscow provided a broad and
region-centered framework for peace consultations on Afghanistan. Space was provided
for regional powers to discuss prospects for peace in Afghanistan at a macro-regional,
South/Central Asian/Eurasian level. Thus, the talks were regionally inclusive yet focused
on political struggles and power-sharing (Stepanova, 2021).
One can recognize an ongoing discussion regarding the inclusion of the
international community, international organizations, including the UN, and powers of
the region in the peace negotiations between the USA, Taliban, and the government of
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, none of these interventions proved to be effective in
monitoring and pressure on parties of the negotiations regarding meaningful participation
of women at the peace table, protection of women’s rights, investigation of war crimes,
provision of an immediate ceasefire, and prevention of human rights violation in the
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country as it was expected. In her interview with the BBC Persian, Habibi calls for
accountability of the Taliban, the government of Afghanistan, and the USA for providing
an inclusive peace in which women, minorities, victims of war, and the general public’s
voices could have been heard (BBC Persian, 2021). Similarly, Mahboba Saraj, head of
the Afghan Women’s Network organization, in an interview with the TRT World,
criticizes the international community, international organizations, the USA, EU, and
other involved stakeholders in Afghanistan’s past 20 years and the recent peace process.
She opens up about her frustration and disappointment with the ways the world handled
Afghanistan’s process of peace and current political situation (TRT World, 2021).
US-Taliban Peace Under the Lens of International Law
US-Taliban’s bilateral peace agreement named “Agreement for Bringing Peace to
Afghanistan” was signed on February 29, 2020. Based on the published version of this
agreement, it is comprised of four sections as follows (Agreement for Bringing Peace,
2020):
1- Guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of
Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States
and its allies.
2- Guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and announcement of a timeline for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.
3- Guarantees and announcement that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will start
intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides.
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4- A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the
intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-Afghan
negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will
be announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political
roadmap of Afghanistan.
The enforcement of the US-Taliban agreement for bringing peace can be critiqued
from different aspects. Firstly, a brief reading of the US-Taliban agreement for bringing
peace shows that the nature of this agreement is also something around the topic of
power-sharing and only on the points of interest for the Taliban and the USA. Thus, the
people of Afghanistan, specifically Afghan women, are not at the center of its attention at
all. As mentioned above, while there is a reference to “intra-Afghan dialogue and
negotiations” in section three of the agreement, there is neither an indication of
guaranteeing women’s meaningful presences and participation in the process of peace
and nor any sort of pressure and assurance is given regarding protection of women’s
rights, human rights, follow up on cases of the victims of war crimes, and many more
during the intra-Afghan negotiations (The Agreement for Bringing Peace, 2020).
Over and above that, I’m critical of the amount of leverage that has been given to the
Taliban from the USA in this agreement. Section four of the agreement states that: “A
permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intraAfghan dialogue and negotiations (The Agreement for Bringing Peace, 2020, 1). While a
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ceasefire was the most urgent need of the people of Afghanistan who have been losing
their lives as a result of the deadly acts of the Taliban at the same time that the peace
negotiations were the ongoing USA, as the source of authority in this case only decided
to keep this issue as “an item,” or basically an option that may be referred to, not a
condition or requirement in return to the many demands of the Taliban, including but not
limited to the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the release of more than 5000 of their
prisoners, etc. (Al Jazeera, 2021). Thus, from the wording of this section one can easily
read that there hasn’t been enough and strong intention for having a proper and inclusive
process of peace for the Afghan people. But it has always been a matter of closing the
case and telling the world that the USA has finished the project in Afghanistan. Besides,
as Maryam Jami, in her piece The Ceasefire or the “Peace” Fire?: Taliban’s Abrupt Takeover
of Afghanistan from an International Legal Perspective stated that it is emphasized that the
Taliban would refrain from committing further violence in Afghanistan and using the
Afghan soil for terroristic purposes in many sections of the agreement. But considering
the recent coup of the Taliban for seizing the rule over Afghanistan following the
withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan in early July 2021, it is proved that not
only they didn’t focus on a ceasefire but also, they increased their violence in the country
(2021, 1).
Furthermore, as mentioned in the literature review chapter, under the rules of
international law, peace agreements should ideally be void of ambiguity and must contain
necessary details. Dates and times should be precisely specified and conformed to. By
signing the bilateral agreement, the US legally committed itself to pull out troops from
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Afghanistan within 14 months after February 2020. However, the withdrawal took place
abruptly and with a three-month delay. The Taliban had warned that they would not
participate in any conference regarding Afghanistan in case the foreign troops do not exit
Afghanistan. This counts as a violation of the parties' time-related provision of the
agreement, which further prevents the timely implementation of the agreement. The
language of the agreement is also vague on the part of the US, and the US has not legally
pledged itself to take on any responsibilities while exiting Afghanistan. Having said that,
the US officials have always voiced concerns that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan may
once again turn into a safe haven of terrorism; they did not anticipate any conditions and
required standards for a cautious and responsible withdrawal (Jami, 2021). Thus, it can be
said that this agreement also hasn’t left much of a practical impact on Afghan women’s
causes and their meaningful participation in the process of peace.
Transnational/beyond border Feminist Networks
Finally, after analyzing the case study of Afghanistan’s recent peace process to find
how Afghan women were marginalized, I want to suggest building transnational/beyond
border feminist networks as an important way that can help Afghan women to highlight
their advocacies and efforts for being included in decision-making processes in
Afghanistan. It is precisely of utmost importance now that history has repeated itself and
the Taliban are ruling Afghanistan once again. For proving this point, I want to reference
the two critical South Asian feminist interventions within two broader social movements
that can be examples for Afghanistan; the Pakistan-India peace movement and the
movement for a People’s Union of South Asia. Many transnational feminists have
70

emphasized that the regional or cross-border feminist movements could help women of
these countries to raise their voices and be included in the processes (Chhachhi and
Abeysekera, 2015).
Similar to this argument, I believe there is a need for transnational feminists to
structurally stand with Afghan women by establishing a regional/beyond borders feminist
movement for creating new spaces for democratic deliberation which works for the
inclusion of Afghan women and their perspectives in essential decision-making
processes. In addition, according to Amrita Chhachhi and Sunila Abeysekera, while
establishing a regional or cross-border deliberation is a costly, time-consuming, and
challenging task but it’s an extremely effective way of enabling feminists of the same
cultures with similar issues and interests to exchange help and knowledge with each
other as well as to put pressure on their governments for more effective intervention
and advocacy for women’s rights (2015, 8-14). In the same line with what Chhachhi
and Abeysekera stated, I think for a very long time, Afghan women and their causes have
been decided on their behalf by the westerners without feeling the need to consult and
hear from Afghan women themselves about their struggles, and with allowing them to
lead the advocacies. Thus, I argue that building these beyond border feminist networks
can be crucial elements for Afghan women’s advocacies to be heard through more
prominent platforms and get highlighted by feminists of different countries while still
keeping Afghan women as a leading part of the advocacies to share their experiences
with the world through their lens and find efficient solutions.
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My research shows that Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom
(hereinafter WILPF) has been one of the few beyond borders feminist organizations that
have been closely working with Afghan women and has highlighted their advocacies in a
specific section of their website and reports during the last few months WILPF’s methods
of work include analysis, awareness-raising, advocacy, activism, and building alliances
(WILPF, 2022). One of their main visions has been to build coalitions and partnerships,
share knowledge, and convene women from all around the world by creating bridges and
spaces for discussion so that women can play their rightful role in decision-making and
help shape the responses that affect their lives and communities (WILPF, 2022). In
addition, their website shows that they have implemented this vision of theirs regarding
Afghanistan by amplifying Afghan women’s voices and their advocacies through their
platform. Among other advocacies, they have been trying to highlight the importance of
Afghan women’s role as leaders of their way into the process of peace by stating that:
“Afghan women activists must continue to initiate and lead the way. The presence
of women at the negotiating table with the Taliban in Oslo should translate into a
comprehensive feminist approach to the crisis in Afghanistan, as seen by Afghan
women themselves” (WILPF, 2022).
Over and above that, it is worth mentioning that, in solidarity with Afghan women
and their marginalization from the process of peace, not only WILPF has dedicated a
specific section to Afghanistan’s peace process, which includes data around different
topics such as “feminist peace,” “militarized masculinity,” and “demilitarization,” but
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also, they have emphasized on lifting Afghan women’s advocacies and changing the
mainstream narrative in their 2021 annual report named “stories of feminist peace”
(WILPF Report, 2022, 4-7). While these kinds of activism are not precisely what we can
call structured transnational feminist networks, they helped serve the purpose at different
levels that can or may end up initiating transnational/beyond border feminist networks.
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Conclusion
I started writing this thesis while I was tirelessly trying to find a way to evacuate
my family, colleagues at Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),
and other women’s human rights defenders from Afghanistan, where they were highly
exposed to the cruelty of the Taliban and trauma resulted from the recent illegitimate
takeover of Afghanistan by the terrorist group of the Taliban on August 15, 2021. As a
woman and an Afghan, writing about war and the failures of the so-called process of
peace that resulted in putting my country, family, colleagues, friends, innocent people of
Afghanistan, and the achievements of the Afghan people in the past few years in grave
danger was challenging and emotion consuming. However, as mentioned at the beginning
of this thesis, I felt the responsibility to lift the voices of my people, specifically Afghan
women who have systematically been sidelined and pushed away from the process of
decision-making concerning peace. Being aware of these emotional tolls, I tried to be
more aware of my privileges over other Afghan women and human rights defenders who
had to hear the sounds of gun fires and bomb explosions, change their locations to keep
themselves safe and witness the loss of their achievements. Accordingly, I took it upon
myself to work on this research and how war, trauma, power structures, and power
fantasies of the western countries positioned Afghan women in the society.
While a simple search of Afghanistan’s name will bring so many different
researches about war, conflict, and peace, I’m confident that there is little research on war
and peace concerning women, specifically from a transnational feminist point of view.
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Over and above that, this thesis is timely research that tries to change the ruling narrative
about Afghan women’s advocacies for being included in the process of peace
negotiations with the Taliban and making the world hear their stories as well as their
experiences of war, trauma, and conflicts over the past years. I have tried to do this from
the standpoint of an Afghan advocate of transnational feminism, just and fair peace, and
anti-war policies and practices in the most uncertain times and the most crucial stage of
decision-making in Afghanistan.
Obviously, whether by choice or necessity, war and conflict bring women to the
fore, and it changes social and gender relations. As devastating war and conflict are for
women, there are also times that women step into the fray and empower themselves.
Unfortunately, they can be easily crushed when peacetime arrives by being recognized as
victims only and not active actors or negotiators. In this thesis, I argued that even though
women’s contribution to peacebuilding and their impact on the ground is vital but
national and international state actors haven’t usually recognized women’s skills and
strategies in addressing war, conflicts, and especially peace-building processes. Among
others, I worked closely on analyzing the case study of Afghanistan regarding Afghan
women’s systemic marginalization from the recent peace process with the Taliban. I
comprehensively analyzed the failures of the peace negotiations and the peace agreement
from a human rights law, international law regarding agreements, and a transnational
feminist perspective. Thus, I emphasized the importance of the role of the international
organizations, powers of the region, and regional, transnational feminist networks in
highlighting these deficiencies in the process of peace and lifting Afghan women’s voices
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as well as forming inclusive peace processes with the practical and meaningful presence
of women.
Following chapter one, in which I portrayed the methodological statement and
located myself through my research by analyzing the impact of my identities in carrying
out this research, in chapter two, I incorporated the available literature around the topic of
women’s contribution to the peace-building process focusing on what has been done in
this regard in national and international settings. Among others, I focused on SCR 1325. I
covered how transnational feminists are skeptical of the potential for UN peace
operations to address women’s undermined positions pointing to the institutional and
political reasons behind this issue. Later on, I pointed out some of the factors of ignoring
women’s role in peace-building, including but not limited to the practices of the
policymakers and powers involved in the peace talks in pushing gender equality or
women’s issues away from the negotiations or peace table stating that these topics should
come at a later stage; non-implementation/ adherence with the Resolution 1325; etc.
Finally, this chapter covered some crucial rules and principles of international law that
need to be considered while incorporating peace agreements. Some of which are clarity
of the peace agreements regarding the responsibilities of the parties involved and having
a monitoring authority or body to guarantee the proper incorporation and implementation
of the peace agreements.
Furthermore, chapter three extensively covered the analysis piece of the thesis by
connecting the theories to the practice and the available data regarding Afghan women’s
marginalization and advocacies for being heard during the process of peace. In this
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chapter, a brief history of war and trauma in Afghanistan showed that women and men
have different war experiences and have been impacted by these notions differently. But
despite all the challenges that Afghan women have gone through, they have continued
their tireless efforts to build their capacities, benefit from their right to education and
employment, and reform the legal system for providing more legal protection for
women’s inclusion in the society. Also, I have covered how Afghan women and their
experiences have been overgeneralized by the western countries and feminism, which
resulted in them justifying the US invasion of Afghanistan based on the ideologies of
“saving the passive, victim, and agency-less Afghan women.” Thus, despite the
advocacies of Afghan women, including the virtual and non-virtual collective activism,
the same practice from the parties involved in the process of peace and the international
community was implemented regarding women’s representation in the process of peace.
Accordingly, Afghan women’s voices were left unheard, and not only their experiences
but also the experiences of the victims of war crimes and other minorities were left out
and ignored throughout the process of peace. Following this, failures of the peace process
were also analyzed through the lens of human rights law and international law regarding
the incorporation of peace agreements. The findings showed that the peace agreement
between the Taliban and the USA has been exclusionary not only because it totally
overlooked to set aside some guarantees for women’s rights and human rights of the
people of Afghanistan, but also it didn’t condition the peace negotiation to implement a
ceasefire and respect for non-violation of the fundamental right of the people in
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Afghanistan. As well as, this agreement failed to provide clarity about different aspects of
the negotiations and comprehensively leveraged one side of the conflict, the Taliban.
Over and above that, this chapter covered the role and impact of the powers of the
region and the world, including but not limited to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and
China, in building sustainable peace in Afghanistan and ensuring meaningful
participation of Afghan women. As well as it emphasized the implementation of the
principles of human rights law during and after the negotiations. Unfortunately, the
findings showed that while these powers had the means and resources to help
Afghanistan and its people with the abovementioned, almost all of their efforts have been
focused on the ideologies of power-sharing and strengthening their influence in
Afghanistan in competition with one another. Thus, there hasn’t been any sign of help
concerning women’s condition from them as well. Consequently, I have concluded this
chapter by emphasizing the importance of building structured transnational feminist
networks that will be able to work side by side with the Afghan women without deciding
on Afghan women’s behalf and highlight their advocacies through their platforms. On the
one hand, this will allow Afghan women to lead their destiny and, for once, decide about
their lives considering their experiences of war, trauma, and marginalization from
decision-making processes. On the other hand, transnational feminist networks will
become an efficient body that not only can lift each-others voices but also put pressure on
different countries involved in decision-making processes such as the recent peace
process to include women, respect human rights, and implement the principles of
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international law to prevent failed processes of decision-making such as the one in
Afghanistan that led the country to go back to its dark years.
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Annexes
Annex one: Text of the Doha Agreement
Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United
States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America
February 29, 2020
which corresponds to Rajab 5, 1441 on the Hijri Lunar calendar
and Hoot 10, 1398 on the Hijri Solar calendar
A comprehensive peace agreement is made of four parts:
1. Guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that will prevent the use of the soil of
Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States
and its allies.
2. Guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and announcement of a timeline for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan.
3. After the announcement of guarantees for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces
and timeline in the presence of international witnesses, and guarantees and the
announcement in the presence of international witnesses that Afghan soil will not
be used against the security of the United States and its allies, the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is
known as the Taliban will start intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides on
March 10, 2020, which corresponds to Rajab.
4. A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the
intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-Afghan
negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will
be announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political
roadmap of Afghanistan.
The four parts above are interrelated and each will be implemented in accordance with its
own agreed timeline and agreed terms. Agreement on the first two parts paves the way
for the last two parts.
Following is the text of the agreement for the implementation of parts one and two of the
above. Both sides agree that these two parts are interconnected. The obligations of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state
and is known as the Taliban in this agreement apply in areas under their control until the
formation of the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the
intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations.
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PART ONE
The United States is committed to withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of the
United States, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian
personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services
personnel within fourteen (14) months following announcement of this agreement, and
will take the following measures in this regard:
A. The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will take the following measures in
the first one hundred thirty-five (135) days:
1) They will reduce the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to eight thousand
six hundred (8,600) and proportionally bring reduction in the number of its
allies and Coalition forces.
2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces
from five (5) military bases.
B. With the commitment and action on the obligations of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known
as the Taliban in Part Two of this agreement, the United States, its allies, and the
Coalition will execute the following:
1) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all
remaining forces from Afghanistan within the remaining nine and a half (9.5)
months.
2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from
remaining bases.
C. The United States is committed to start immediately to work with all relevant
sides on a plan to expeditiously release combat and political prisoners as a
confidence building measure with the coordination and approval of all relevant
sides. Up to five thousand (5,000) prisoners of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the
Taliban and up to one thousand (1,000) prisoners of the other side will be released
by March 10, 2020, the first day of intra-Afghan negotiations, which corresponds
to Rajab 15, 1441 on the Hijri Lunar calendar and Hoot 20, 1398 on the Hijri
Solar calendar. The relevant sides have the goal of releasing all the remaining
prisoners over the course of the subsequent three months. The United States
commits to completing this goal. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not
recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban commits
that its released prisoners will be committed to the responsibilities mentioned in
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this agreement so that they will not pose a threat to the security of the United
States and its allies.
D. With the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the United States will initiate an
administrative review of current U.S. sanctions and the rewards list against
members of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the
United States as a state and is known as the Taliban with the goal of removing
these sanctions by August 27, 2020, which corresponds to Muharram 8, 1442 on
the Hijri Lunar calendar and Saunbola 6, 1399 on the Hijri Solar calendar.
E. With the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the United States will start diplomatic
engagement with other members of the United Nations Security Council and
Afghanistan to remove members of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is
not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban from
the sanctions list with the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020, which
corresponds to Shawwal 6, 1441 on the Hijri Lunar calendar and Jawza 9, 1399
on the Hijri Solar calendar.
F. The United States and its allies will refrain from the threat or the use of force
against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic
affairs.
PART TWO
In conjunction with the announcement of this agreement, the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the
Taliban will take the following steps to prevent any group or individual, including alQa’ida, from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States
and its allies:
1. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States
as a state and is known as the Taliban will not allow any of its members, other
individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to
threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
2. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States
as a state and is known as the Taliban will send a clear message that those who
pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in
Afghanistan, and will instruct members of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the
Taliban not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the
United States and its allies.
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3. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States
as a state and is known as the Taliban will prevent any group or individual in
Afghanistan from threatening the security of the United States and its allies, and
will prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising and will not host them
in accordance with the commitments in this agreement.
4. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States
as a state and is known as the Taliban is committed to deal with those seeking
asylum or residence in Afghanistan according to international migration law and
the commitments of this agreement, so that such persons do not pose a threat to
the security of the United States and its allies.
5. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States
as a state and is known as the Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel
permits, or other legal documents to those who pose a threat to the security of the
United States and its allies to enter Afghanistan.
PART THREE
1. The United States will request the recognition and endorsement of the United
Nations Security Council for this agreement.
2. The United States and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized
by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban seek positive relations
with each other and expect that the relations between the United States and the
new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intraAfghan dialogue and negotiations will be positive.
3. The United States will seek economic cooperation for reconstruction with the new
post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan
dialogue and negotiations, and will not intervene in its internal affairs.
Signed in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020, which corresponds to Rajab 5, 1441 on the
Hijri Lunar calendar and Hoot 10, 1398 on the Hijri Solar calendar, in duplicate, in
Pashto, Dari, and English languages, each text being equally authentic.
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Annex two: Text of the Joint Declaration
[Issued February 29, 2020]
Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United
States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a member of the United Nations and recognized by the
United States and the international community as a sovereign state under international law, and
the United States of America are committed to working together to reach a comprehensive and
sustainable peace agreement that ends the war in Afghanistan for the benefit of all Afghans and
contributes to regional stability and global security. A comprehensive and sustainable peace
agreement will include four parts: 1) guarantees to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any
international terrorist groups or individuals against the security of the United States and its allies,
2) a timeline for the withdrawal of all U.S. and Coalition forces from Afghanistan, 3) a political
settlement resulting from intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations between the Taliban and an
inclusive negotiating team of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and 4) a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire. These four parts are interrelated and interdependent. Pursuit of peace
after long years of fighting reflects the goal of all parties who seek a sovereign, unified
Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States have partnered closely since 2001 to
respond to threats to international peace and security and help the Afghan people chart a secure,
democratic and prosperous future. The two countries are committed to their longstanding
relationship and their investments in building the Afghan institutions necessary to establish
democratic norms, protect and preserve the unity of the country, and promote social and
economic advancements and the rights of citizens. The commitments set out here are made
possible by these shared achievements. Afghan and U.S. security forces share a special bond
forged during many years of tremendous sacrifice and courage. The Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan reaffirm their support for peace and their willingness
to negotiate an end to this war.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan welcomes the Reduction in Violence period and takes note
of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, an important step toward ending the war. The U.S-Taliban
agreement paves the way for intra-Afghan negotiations on a political settlement and a permanent
and comprehensive ceasefire. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms its readiness to
participate in such negotiations and its readiness to conclude a ceasefire with the Taliban.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan furthermore reaffirms its ongoing commitment to prevent
any international terrorist groups or individuals, including al-Qa’ida and ISIS-K, from using
Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States, its allies and other countries. To
accelerate the pursuit of peace, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan confirms its support for the
phased withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces subject to the Taliban’s fulfillment of its
commitments under the U.S.-Taliban agreement and any agreement resulting from intra-Afghan
negotiations.
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The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States therefore have made the following
commitments:

PART ONE
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States recognize that al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K and
other international terrorist groups or individuals continue to use Afghan soil to recruit members,
raise funds, train adherents and plan and attempt to conduct attacks that threaten the security of
the United States, its allies, and Afghanistan. To address this continuing terrorist threat, the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States will continue to take the following steps to
defeat al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and other international terrorist groups or individuals:
1. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms its continued commitment not to cooperate with
or permit international terrorist groups or individuals to recruit, train, raise funds (including
through the production or distribution of narcotics), transit Afghanistan or misuse its
internationally-recognized travel documents, or conduct other support activities in Afghanistan,
and will not host them.
2. The United States re-affirms its commitments regarding support for the Afghan security forces
and other government institutions, including through ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of
Afghan security forces to deter and respond to internal and external threats, consistent with its
commitments under existing security agreements between the two governments. This
commitment includes support to Afghan security forces to prevent al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and other
international terrorist groups or individuals from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States
and its allies.
3. The United States re-affirms its readiness to continue to conduct military operations in
Afghanistan with the consent of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in order to disrupt and
degrade efforts by al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and other international terrorist groups or individuals to
carry out attacks against the United States or its allies, consistent with its commitments under
existing security agreements between the two governments and with the existing understanding
that U.S. counterterrorism operations are intended to complement and support Afghan security
forces’ counterterrorism operations, with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and full regard for
the safety and security of the Afghan people and the protection of civilians.
4. The United States commits to facilitate discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan to work
out arrangements to ensure neither country’s security is threatened by actions from the territory of
the other side.

PART TWO
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States have consulted extensively on U.S.
and Coalition force levels and the military activities required to achieve the foregoing
commitments including through support to Afghan security and defense forces. Subject to the
Taliban’s fulfillment of its commitments under the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan, the United States, and the Coalition jointly assess that the current levels of
military forces are no longer necessary to achieve
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security objectives; since 2014, Afghan security forces have been in the lead for providing
security and have increased their effectiveness. As such, the parties commit to take the following
measures:
1. The United States will reduce the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 and
implement other commitments in the U.S.-Taliban agreement within 135 days of the
announcement of this joint declaration and the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and will work with its
allies and the Coalition to reduce proportionally the number of Coalition forces in Afghanistan
over an equivalent period, subject to the Taliban’s fulfillment of its commitments under the U.S.Taliban agreement.
2. Consistent with the joint assessment and determination between the United States and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete the
withdrawal of their remaining forces from Afghanistan within 14 months following the
announcement of this joint declaration and the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and will withdraw all
their forces from remaining bases, subject to the Taliban’s fulfillment of its commitments under
the U.S.-Taliban agreement.
3. The United States re-affirms its commitment to seek funds on a yearly basis that support the
training, equipping, advising and sustaining of Afghan security forces, so that Afghanistan can
independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats.
4. To create the conditions for reaching a political settlement and achieving a permanent,
sustainable ceasefire, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will participate in a U.S.-facilitated
discussion with Taliban representatives on confidence building measures, to include determining
the feasibility of releasing significant numbers of prisoners on both sides. The United States and
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will seek the assistance of the ICRC to support this discussion.
5. With the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan commits to
start diplomatic engagement with members of the UN Security Council to remove members of the
Taliban from the sanctions list with the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020, and in
any case no later than 30 days after finalizing a framework agreement and a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire.

PART THREE
1. The United States will request the recognition and endorsement of the UN Security Council for
this agreement and related arrangements.
2. The United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are committed to continue positive
relations, including economic cooperation for reconstruction.
3. The United States will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs.
4. The United States will continue to work to build regional and international consensus to
support the ongoing effort to achieve a political settlement to the principal conflict in
Afghanistan.
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Annex three: Summery
Method

Data Source

Type of Data Source

Content Analysis

#MyRedLine

Social Media Campaign on
Twitter

Patchwork Virtual
Ethnography

Together
Stronger

WhatsApp Group

Case Study

List of Reports and Documents Analyzed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action
From Rhetoric to Reality: Afghan Women on the Agenda for Peace
2012 Women's Participation in the Afghan Peace Process
Doha Agreement and the Joint Declaration
UNSCR 1325 and the National Action Plan 2015-2022
Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
A Declaration Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and The United
States for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan

List of Organizations
Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom (WILPF)
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